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Abstract
This thesis is an expansion of Rasmussen & Carroll (2014). The theme is bias, a prominent one
in the interest group literature, and the focus is on the European Commission’s online consulta-
tions. The research question is: Which features pertaining to online consultations can explain
participation bias? Bias is defined as the distribution of different types of interests, and interest
groups are thus the participants studied. Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical
framework based on pluralism lays the foundation to which specifications are added. These in-
clude a cost-benefit and an exchange theoretical perspective. Pluralism expects every affected
interest to be represented. The specifications add that groups representing affected interests
might not participate if the costs of doing so are high compared to the potential benefits, or
if they do not possess relevant information. The new hypotheses concern the organizer, for-
mat and technical complexity of the online consultations. The effect of government activity is
moreover considered. One new hypothesis, concerning salience, related to the initial plural-
ist framework is added as well. Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations are
included, but they are secondary since they have been explored in depth previously.
The hypotheses are examined by running various regressions. In addition to Rasmussen
& Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) consultation features, two new aspects are found to explain
participation bias. First, technically complex consultations are generally more biased than
less complex ones. Second, online consultations organized by regulatory Directorate-Generals
(DGs) are generally biased towards business interests. One of the European Commission’s
goals with the consultations is inclusiveness (European Commission, 2002, pp. 16-17). The
findings indicate that further measures need to be undertaken to ensure this in technically com-
plex consultations or those organized by regulatory DGs.
Compared to Rasmussen & Carroll (2014), the study is improved methodologically as
well. Misspecified statistical models are respecified and improved, a quasi-separated estimate
is pointed out and considered, and the statistical power to detect effects of different sizes is
examined.
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1 Introduction
The study of bias has been a prominent part of the interest group literature since its inception.
A bias towards business interests has been the overall refrain, including in the European Union
(EU) (Coen, 2007, p. 335; Wonka et al., 2010, pp. 467-469). Little attention has been given
to how the characteristics of participatory activities affect bias, however. One exception is
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014) who examine participation bias in the European Commission’s
online consultations. This thesis is an expansion of their study, with the research question:
Which features pertaining to online consultations can explain participation bias?
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical framework is based on pluralist
ideas, where all affected interests are assumed to be represented. However, being affected does
not necessarily lead to participation. Some may for instance be less affected than others. If
participating then is costly in terms of time, information or other resources – or if the poten-
tial gains are small – groups representing less affected interests might not contribute. This
cost-benefit aspect of participating is included in this thesis, thus taking the initial pluralist
framework one step further by considering when affected groups are less likely to participate.
Furthermore, an exchange theoretical view is added, where interest groups’ supply and DGs’
demand for information are the focal point. Groups might be affected but still not participate
because they do not possess relevant information to do so.
Several new hypotheses are derived from the expanded theoretical framework. Two of these
are supported by the results of the regression analyses. First, technically complex consultations
are generally more biased than less complex ones, as expected based on cost-benefit reason-
ing. In addition, the type of Directorate-General (DG) organizing a consultation is found to
affect the direction of the bias. Consultations organized by regulatory DGs are generally biased
towards business interests. This hypothesis is based on the exchange theoretical framework.
These findings are relevant in a broader sense. One of the Commission’s goals is for the con-
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sultations to be inclusive (European Commission, 2002, pp. 16-17). The findings here indicate
that to be able to achieve these, it is not sufficient to have the consultations be formally open
for everyone. If the matters they concern are technically complex or if the consultations are
organized by regulatory DGs, further action need to be taken to incite wider participation. This
is furthermore related to how interest groups function as a channel between civil society and
decision-makers, in addition to the electoral channel (Persson, 2007, p. 225). When only some
types of interests are represented, how well this channel functions can be questioned. Decision-
makers are unlikely to only take the interests of those participating into account (Lowery, 2007,
pp. 34-36), but biased participation might still lead to less representative proposals.
Having introduced the thesis’ theme, research question and main findings, the rest of this
introductory chapter is structured as follows. The underlying interest group perspectives in
this thesis are presented, including how they relate to the subject matter of this thesis. A
summary of Rasmussen & Carroll (2014) is then provided, in addition to a motivation for
why examining additional explanatory factors is relevant. The limits of choosing to study
online consultations in the EU, in terms of being able to generalize the findings to national
settings, are also discussed. Lastly, a brief summary of this introductory chapter is given before
providing an outline of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Interest group perspectives and online consultations
The study of bias constitutes a considerable part of the interest group literature. The pluralist
and transactions perspectives have defined the field since the 1950s. In later years, an additional
perspective – neo-pluralism – has emerged, which reads as a fusion between the two initial ones
(Lowery, 2007, pp. 31-34). These perspectives, and how they relate to this thesis, are discussed
here. It is furthermore argued that the online consultations lay the groundwork for pluralistic
participation patterns. It is worth noting that bias is understood mainly as an empirical, not
normative, concept in this thesis.
During the 1950s and ’60s, pluralism was the dominant force in interest group studies
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, pp. 48-50). Pluralist theory expects that when someone’s in-
terests are being threatened, the affected individuals will mobilize and form interest groups.
When one group is formed, new interests are potentially threatened, resulting in the formation
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of additional groups (Truman, 1951, pp. 40-44). The interest group population in a given so-
ciety will accordingly reflect all salient interests and be free of bias (Baumgartner & Leech,
1998, p. 54; Lowery, 2007, p. 31). Because of this, interest groups are viewed as an asset to
democracy. The entire range of relevant interests is available to supply their views to the gov-
ernment (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998, p. 48). This relates to the first step of mobilization, the
formation of interest groups. The second step concerns political participation (Schlozman et
al., 2012, p. 272). Here, pluralism would expect every interest affected by the subject matter of
a consultation to be represented.
In the transactions perspective, the idea that all actors whose interests are threatened will
mobilize and form interest groups is opposed. To mobilize, selective incentives are needed.
Individuals will form or join interest groups if they can gain something from doing so which
they would otherwise miss out on. This is not the case for collective and diffuse interests.
The benefits arising from mobilizing here will befall everyone whether one joins or not. Each
individual is therefore better off by free riding on the efforts of others, resulting in a collective
action problem. When everyone follows this logic, no groups will be formed to represent
collective and diffuse interests. The result is a biased interest group population. Certain types
of interests are represented while others remain latent, making the population unrepresentative
of the distribution of interests in society (Lowery, 2007, p. 32; Olson, 1971, pp. 1-2, 11-16,
21).
Translated to online consultations, an interest group has selective incentives to participate
if it expects that no other group representing the same interests is likely to contribute. If this
is not the case, the group in question could free ride on the contributions of other groups with
similar interests. If each of these groups follows this logic, however, their interests would not
be represented at all. The result would therefore be a more biased participation pattern. If no or
only a few other groups represent the same interests, the group would have selective incentives
to participate since their interests would otherwise not be represented.
Neo-pluralism merges insights from the pluralist and transactions perspectives. Empirical
findings have shown that the collective action problem is not as severe as expected (Lowery &
Gray, 2004, p. 166; Lowery, 2007, p. 34). Citizen groups, representing collective and diffuse
interests, do mobilize and constitute more than a negligible part of interest group populations
(Hojnacki et al., 2012, p. 382). Incentives other than selective ones can lead to mobilization,
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such as purposive or solidary ones. In the latter case, groups are formed because of the social
aspects they offer. Purposive incentives motivate mobilization based on the end goals of the
group that are of no direct benefit to the members themselves (Clark & Wilson, 1961, pp. 134-
136). The interest group population is not as unbiased as pluralism expects, but not as biased
as assumed in the transactions perspective either (Lowery & Gray, 2004, p. 166). In the online
consultations, different incentives might motivate groups to participate, resulting in a partici-
pation pattern that lies somewhere between unbiased and biased.
Of these three interest group perspectives, the online consultations lay the groundwork for
pluralistic participation patterns. In contrast to the Commission’s other consultation activities,
such as expert groups, forums and conferences, there are few hurdles to overcome for interest
groups that want to participate. No invitation is needed and the groups can contribute from
wherever they are, as long as they have Internet access or are able to send their submission by
postal mail (Greenwood, 2011, p. 209; Quittkat & Kotzian, 2011, pp. 401-404; Rasmussen &
Carroll, 2014, p. 449). That no invitation is required leaves the decision of whether to contribute
or not entirely in the hands of each interest group. Contributing to online consultations is
also possibly less costly, since it can take place from wherever a group finds itself. Being in
Brussels, for instance, is not necessary. This makes participating possible for less resourceful
interest groups as well. Online consultations thus constitute a most likely case for pluralistic
participation patterns.
The openness of online consultations could mean that they are less attractive lobbying tools.
This is not likely to be the case, however. Online consultations are intended for the Commis-
sion’s policy proposals that are expected to have a substantial impact on affected parties, or
that concern larger policy reforms. Lobbying at this early stage is important. It gives an actor
the possibility of contributing to shape a proposal before it is debated by the Council and the
European Parliament. For these institutions, accepting a proposal is easier than modifying it.
This makes potentially exerting influence at the proposal stage pertinent (European Commis-
sion, 2002, p. 15; Klu¨ver, 2011, p. 485; Quittkat & Kotzian, 2011, p. 405). Interest groups are
therefore assumed to be interested in participating in online consultations.
Studying participation bias in online consultations can thus shed light on whether any char-
acteristics facilitate pluralistic participation patterns. The features that lead to more biased
outcomes – in line with the picture painted by the transactions or neo-pluralist perspective –
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are also uncovered. In addition, two of the new hypotheses relate to the direction of the bias –
whether the consultations are biased towards business or civil society interests. The related re-
sults here can show whether the expected interest group types dominate, or if the participation
is not as biased as predicted and leaning more towards a pluralistic or neo-pluralistic pattern.
1.2 Explaining participation bias
As mentioned, Rasmussen & Carroll (2014) lays the foundation for this thesis. In this section, a
summary of this study is provided. Furthermore, a motivation for why it is relevant to continue
studying this is given. Lastly, the limits of choosing to study online consultations in the EU, in
terms of being able to generalize the results to national settings, are discussed.
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014) study participation bias in the Commission’s online consul-
tations. The degree of bias in each consultation is determined based on the distribution of
represented substantive interests. To measure this, it is necessary to know which interests a
participant represents. Interest groups are thus the relevant actors. To explain participation
bias, pluralist theory is used. Four expectations are derived from this, where the main focus
is how broad the range of affected interests is likely to be. These concern the policy type and
cost structure of the proposal a consultation1 deals with, as well as the number of interest group
participants and how biased a consultation is when it comes to the types of actors participating.
The expectations concern the general degree of bias, but whether the variables affect the bias
towards business interests is examined as well. This is because bias is often posited as a bias
towards business. All of their hypotheses are supported by the results of their ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression. Every variable, except the number of interest group participants, is
also found to affect the bias towards business (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, pp. 446-448, 450,
453-456).
In this thesis, a number of new hypotheses for why online consultations are biased are
examined. Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations are furthermore kept, but
are secondary since they have been examined in depth before. Space is instead given to the
new hypotheses. The research question is: Which features pertaining to online consultations
can explain participation bias? One of the Commission’s goals is for the consultations to be
1“Online consultations” and “consultations” are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
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inclusive (European Commission, 2002, pp. 16-17). The aim is to gain a better understanding
of the consultation characteristics that decrease and increase the likelihood of achieving these
goals. In a broader sense, this concerns how well the interest groups function as a channel
between civil society and decision-makers. Less biased participation patterns can make it easier
for the Commission to take the interests in society into account when continuing work on the
proposal a consultation concerns. This relates to the concept of deliberative democracy (Finke,
2007, pp. 4, 15). If the participation instead is biased, less representative proposals might be the
outcome. In these cases, whether the interest group channel functions as a source to democratic,
input legitimacy can be questioned.
The motivation for continuing to examine potential explanatory factors behind participation
bias is to see whether non-pluralistic aspects affect bias as well. Interests are not necessarily
affected to the same degree by a consultation. If the costs associated with participating are
relatively high, or the potential benefits small, groups representing less affected interests might
not participate. The costs may exceed the benefits of contributing for these groups, leading to a
more biased participation pattern. A cost-benefit framework can thus shed further light on what
explains participation bias. The supply and demand for information is moreover considered.
The focus here is on what the organizers of the consultations – the DGs – typically demand
and what the different types of interest groups supply. Some groups might be affected by a
consultation but not possess the relevant information to participate, making it less likely that
they do. In sum, there might be other relevant factors that can explain why consultations are
biased. That the R2 from Rasmussen & Carroll’s (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 455) OLS
regression is around 0.33 underlines that there is more variance left to explain.
In addition, a demarcation is made between what is likely to affect the direction of the bias
and the general degree of it. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 447-448, 453-456) hypothesize
about what is likely to affect the general degree of bias, but they also examine whether any of
their variables affect the bias towards business interests. Here, two new hypotheses are added
that specifically concern the direction the bias is expected to take.
The explanatory factors that are found to affect participation bias in the EU might apply
in national settings as well. Online consultations are not unique for the EU. They are also
organized in some national states (Rasmussen, 2015, pp. 3-4, 11-12). They furthermore resem-
ble written consultations but with the additional possibility of participating online. There are
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nevertheless differences between national settings and the EU that might limit the possibility
of generalizing the results. The prevalence of EU wide associations and groups from different
national settings at the EU level is one such difference. The EU also mainly deals with reg-
ulatory matters, with distributive ones for largely left to the discretion of each member state
(Hix & Høyland, 2011, pp. 189, 218). This may make it more relevant for business interests to
try to influence the Commission (Coen, 1997, p. 24). The broader responsibilities of national
authorities might attract a more diverse range of interests. The generalization possibilities are
therefore limited.
1.3 Summary
In this introductory chapter, the theme and research question were presented, the interest group
perspectives underlying the thesis were elaborated upon, and a motivation for why continuing
to explore this is relevant was given. Building on Rasmussen & Carroll (2014), the aim is to
explore which features pertaining to online consultations that can explain participation bias.
The online consultations investigated are the ones organized by the European Commission.
There are few barriers to entry in these consultations, making them a most likely case for a low
degree of bias and pluralistic participation patterns. Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-
448) pluralist framework is broadened. Groups might be affected to different degrees, and how
resource demanding participating is can therefore also affect bias. To take this into account, a
cost-benefit as well as an exchange theoretical framework are added.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The rest of the thesis is outlined as follows. In the second chapter, following this introduc-
tory one, the theoretical framework is detailed. A brief literature review of relevant empirical
research follows each theoretical section. Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) initial
framework is first presented. The main idea here is that consultations that affect a larger part of
the public are less biased. Seeing that their expectations have been examined in depth before,
they are secondary in this thesis to make room for discussing the new hypotheses. The new
add-ons to the initial framework are subsequently discussed, where the overarching theme is
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the resources needed to participate. The new hypotheses concern the salience, technical com-
plexity and format of the consultations, an interaction between complexity and salience, as well
as the type of organizer and EU activity.
In Chapter 3, the data, coding procedure and variable measures are presented and discussed.
98 new consultations are added to the initial sample. The new observations were coded by the
author twice to be able to test the intra-coder reliability, which is found to generally be high.
The population is every online consultation organized by the European Commission between
December 2001 and August 2011, whereas the sample includes the consultations where infor-
mation about the participants has been published. This information is necessary to be able to
code the dependent variable measures. How the sample might differ from the population is
furthermore discussed. Concerning variable measures, Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 453-
454) operationalizations are kept in this thesis. The new independent variables are measured
using operationalizations found in the interest group literature.
In Chapter 4, a first look at the data is provided. Descriptive statistics for the variables
are presented. Whether the new hypotheses are supported by the results of bivariate analyses
is furthermore considered. Technical complexity, format and the type of DG organizing a
consultation are found to affect bias as hypothesized. The hypotheses concerning salience
and activity are not supported. These results give an indication of what the outcome of the
regression analyses is likely to be. Lastly, which statistical models that are appropriate given
the dependent variable measures are discussed. OLS, multilevel linear and fractional regression
models are found to be suitable.
In Chapter 5, the results of the regression analyses are presented and discussed. The hy-
potheses concerning the general degree of bias are first considered. Technical complexity and
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) variables have the expected effect on bias here.
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 453-456) also examine whether any of their variables affect
the bias towards business, since this type of bias is a common refrain in the literature. This
is therefore done in this thesis as well. Some of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448)
variables, as well as technical complexity, are found to affect the bias towards business. The
results indicate that there might be some differences between what explains bias in general and
what explains the bias towards business interests. Lastly, the two new hypotheses concerning
the direction of the bias specifically are examined. Consultations organized by regulatory DGs
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are found to be biased towards business interests, as expected. The results concerning the inter-
action between technical complexity and salience are uncertain, but some are in the expected
direction.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. The larger implications of the findings are discussed. The
participation in technically complex consultations, as well as those organized by regulatory
DGs, is biased. In these cases, the input legitimacy that can be derived from the interest group
channel is reduced. If the Commission wants these consultations to be more inclusive, extra
measures to ensure this might be needed. Furthermore, how the participation patterns align with
the pluralist, transactions and neo-pluralist perspectives is considered. When fewer interests are
assumed to be affected, or the costs associated with participating are assumed to be high, the
patterns are mostly biased. When more interests are assumed to be affected, or the costs are
lower, neo-pluralistic participation patterns are generally the outcome. Few consultations are
characterized by fairly unbiased participation, in line with the pluralist perspective. Lastly,
the main findings of the thesis are summarized. Technical complexity and the type of DG
organizing a consultation are the two new characteristics found to explain participation bias.
To be able to conclude with more certainty that the other new hypotheses are not supported,
however, a larger sample is needed.
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2 Theoretical framework and literature
review
In this chapter, the theoretical framework of the thesis is presented. The unit of analysis is on-
line consultations. Bias is defined based on the distribution of different types of interest groups
in a given consultation (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 446). If the distribution is skewed in any
one direction, the participation pattern is described as biased. This is a descriptive, rather than
normative, definition. It does furthermore not take the distribution of interests in the interest
group population into account.
First, Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) framework is presented and discussed.
The main underlying aspect of this framework is pluralistic. The degree of conflict between
different types of interests is in focus. Their expectations are secondary in this thesis since they
have been examined in depth previously. Priority is instead given to the new hypotheses. The
expectations are nevertheless kept, since they have been found to explain bias. Second, the
add-ons to the initial framework are discussed. This is more specifically a cost-benefit and an
exchange theoretical perspective. Whether affected interests participate is assumed to depend
on how resource demanding participating is. The hypotheses are presented after the theoretical
accounts, and are generally based on theory rather than empirical findings. Relevant previous
empirical findings are, however, also presented in this chapter.
2.1 Rasmussen and Carroll’s theoretical framework
The main theme in Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical framework is con-
flict. Different degrees of conflict are expected to result in differences in how biased the partic-
ipation is. Underlying this is pluralism. Actors whose interests are affected by a consultation
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are assumed to want to contribute to protect their interests. Consultations that impinge on a
broader set of interests are therefore expected to be less biased than those that affect fewer in-
terests. The expectations derived from this framework are expanded upon in this section. They
are secondary here since they have been examined in depth previously. They are nevertheless
kept, since Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 454-456) find support for all of them. Examining
whether the expectations are still supported when both the sample and model are expanded in
this thesis is therefore relevant.
2.1.1 Distribution of costs across actors and sectors
The type of policy proposal a consultation concerns can potentially affect participation bias.
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 447) distinguish between regulatory and distributive policies.
Distributive policies require public spending. A larger pool of actors is assumed to carry the
costs of such proposals. The number of affected interests will therefore be higher. Regulations,
on the other hand, impinge on the behavior of a specific and smaller set of the public. Fewer
interests are assumed to have to carry the costs of such proposals and be affected by them.
Consultations concerning regulatory proposals are therefore expected to be more biased than
those concerning distributive ones (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 447).
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 447) also hypothesize that the proposals’ cost structure af-
fects bias. This structure is either characterized by concentrated or diffuse costs. Concentrated
ones are limited to a smaller number of sectors, while diffuse costs are spread among several
sectors and/or taxpayers in general. Based on this, consultations concerning proposals with
diffuse costs are assumed to affect a broader range of interests. They are therefore expected to
be less biased. Proposals with concentrated costs are assumed to affect fewer interests, leading
to more biased consultations (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 447).
Discussion
Based on the transactions perspective described in Chapter 1, Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014,
p. 447) abovementioned expectations can be challenged. Consultations concerning distributive
proposals, or ones with a diffuse cost structure, are assumed to impinge on a broader range of
interests. However, affected interest groups might not participate if they do not have selective
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incentives to do so, as the ideas in the transactions perspective imply. Groups representing
diffuse interests may assume that they can free ride on the contributions of others with similar
interest positions1. If every group of this type follows this logic, the result is that these interests
go unrepresented. The participation bias in these consultations may therefore not be any lower
than in those concerning regulatory proposals, or ones with a concentrated cost structure.
A hypothetical example that illustrates this is a consultation concerning farm subsidies –
a distributive policy. The interests of consumers are affected here, since subsidies affect food
prices. A consumer group is therefore a relevant potential contributor. However, the possible
gains from contributing – lower food prices – are diffused among all consumers, including the
members and constituencies of other consumer groups. Each consumer group’s best response is
therefore to free ride on other consumer groups’ contributions. If every group follows this logic,
this type of diffuse interest will not be represented at all. In contrast to consumer groups, farmer
groups might have selective incentives to contribute. Contributing can have consequences for
their specific members and constituencies, which no other group represents. Each farmer group
can thus not count on other farmer groups to represent their members’ particular interests. Their
selective incentives are therefore assumed to drive them to participate.
Based on the transactions perspective, this hypothetical consultation concerning a distribu-
tive proposal is likely to be biased. The groups with selective incentives to participate will
do so. Groups that face diffuse benefits, on the other hand, will not be incited to participate
because they can free ride on the contributions of similar groups. If all these groups follow
this logic, their interests will not be represented. It can therefore be theorized that consulta-
tions concerning distributive proposals are not necessarily less biased than those concerning
regulatory matters. The same applies to consultations with a diffuse compared to concentrated
cost structure. When controlling for new factors – as is done in this thesis – the correlations
between the initial independent and dependent variables might be affected. The effects of pol-
icy type and cost structure might be overestimated because relevant explanatory factors are left
out. Whether this is the case for the policy type and cost structure estimates will be seen here.
1This argument hinges on that there are numerous interest groups representing the same kind of interest.
Otherwise, coordination between similar kinds of groups may take place.
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2.1.2 Actor bias and interest group density
In addition to the theoretical expectations concerning the distribution of costs, Rasmussen &
Carroll (2014, pp. 447-448) expect that the degree of bias will vary with the distribution of the
actors participating in a consultation. Truman (1951, pp. 52-55) argues how changes in one
institution likely results in changes in adjacent institutions. Complexity in one area usually
goes hand in hand with complexity in other areas. When society is evolving and becoming
more complex, more interest groups will be established and the diversity in the interest group
population will increase. Societal development thus also results in interest group development.
Given that the EU is the only system examined, Truman’s (1951, pp. 52-55) hypothesis cannot
be used (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 448).
Instead, the same logic is applied to online consultations. Consultations are regarded as
complex if they attract participation from different kinds of actors, such as companies, individ-
uals, public organizations and interest groups. If consultations are complex in this regard, they
are also assumed to be complex when it comes to the types of interest groups participating.
That is, a lower degree of actor bias is likely to correlate with a lower degree of participation
bias (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 448).
Lastly, the concept of countervailing power may also be relevant to explain participation
bias (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 448). Originally, this concept concerns the formation of
interest groups. When one kind of group is formed, individuals with conflicting interests are
affected. These will mobilize and form interest groups to countervail the views of the initial
groups. All salient and relevant interests will therefore be represented in the interest group
population. These ideas, presented by Truman (1951, pp. 40-44), are at the core of the pluralist
view of interest groups. In the context of online consultations, interest groups are assumed to
be motivated by wanting to countervail the perspectives of other groups. When one type of
group participates, other groups might be incited to participate. Thus, when the interest group
density in a consultation is higher, bias is expected to be lower (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014,
p. 448).
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Discussion
While the theoretical account behind the actor bias expectation starts out as interesting, the
result borders on being trivial. Gerring (2005, p. 170) lists different criteria for what makes a
causal2 argument interesting. One of them is “differentiation” (Gerring, 2005, pp. 174-175). It
should be possible to differentiate between the independent and dependent variables. In this
case, both the independent and dependent variables concern bias. Actor bias and participation
bias can therefore be said to be variations on the same theme. Another criteria is “priority”
(Gerring, 2005, pp. 170, 175-176). The independent variable should not be closely related in
time to the dependent variable. This is not the case for actor bias and participation bias. Both
are the outcome of actors choosing to participate or not, and they may therefore said to be
concurrent. This is also the case for the expectation regarding interest group density, which
concern the number of interest group participants in a consultation. The actor bias expectation
in particular, but also the interest group density one, is thus less interesting than the other
expectations.
2.2 Theoretical specifications
In this section, the add-ons to Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical frame-
work are presented. An exchange theoretical and a cost-benefit perspective are added. The first
relates to interest groups’ supply and DGs’ demand for information, from which a hypothesis
concerning the type of DG organizing a consultation is derived. The cost-benefit perspective
mostly concerns how costly participating is likely to be. More specifically, hypotheses related
to EU activity, the format and technical complexity of a consultation and an interaction effect
between salience and technical complexity are derived from this perspective. The main as-
sumption is that less affected groups might refrain from participating if they do not possess the
relevant information to do so, or if the costs associated with contributing is too high compared
to the potential benefits. This is expected to lead to more biased participation patterns. A new
feature – salience – derived from the initial, pluralist framework is also added and discussed.
2Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 454) analysis is quantitative, as is this thesis’. Causal relationships between
the variables are therefore not explored – correlations are. The aim is still explanation, however, which makes the
criteria relevant.
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Relevant previous research is considered after each hypothesis.
Whereas all of the expectations of Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 447-448) concern the
general degree of bias, some of the new ones concern the direction of it. That is, whether
consultations are expected to be biased towards for instance business or civil society interests.
There are for this reason several dependent variable measures, which is discussed in Chapter
3. However, the presentation of the theoretical specifications is structured according to the
independent, not the dependent, variables. The hypotheses related to the direction of the bias
are, in other words, interspersed among the ones related to the general degree of it.
2.2.1 Salience
The first new aspect that is added to the expanded model in this thesis is the salience of the
consultations. Salient consultations are likely to affect the interests of a larger part of the public
and be more prominent on the policy agenda than less salient consultations (Gormley, 1986,
p. 598; Lowry & Joslyn, 2014, p. 154; Rasmussen et al., 2014, pp. 253-254). This relates to
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical framework. Salient consultations are
assumed to affect a larger range of interests than less salient ones, and are thus expected to be
less biased as well.
Hypothesis 1 Consultations concerning less salient matters are more biased than consulta-
tions concerning salient matters.
Of relevant previous findings, Rasmussen et al. (2014, pp. 253-254, 257, 260-262) carry
out a quantitative study where they investigate whether salience affects the number of interest
group participants in the Commission’s online consultations. They find a correlation between
a high degree of salience and more participants. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 454-456), as
mentioned, find a correlation between the number of interest group participants and bias. These
findings indicate that salience might affect the degree of bias as well.
2.2.2 Supply and demand for information
Having introduced salience, the additional hypothesis derived from the same pluralist frame-
work as that of Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 447-448), the exchange theoretical perspective
is considered here.
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The majority of the Commission’s staff is concerned with translation and interpretation,
whereas only about 20% of the 28,000 employees work in policy-related areas. For com-
parison, this is about the same amount as a medium-sized European national government de-
partment (Corbett et al., 2012, p. 53). The policy-related resources of the Commission are
therefore limited. When the Commission is working out legislative proposals, collecting rel-
evant information is resource demanding. Interest groups can lessen this burden by providing
information – for instance via online consultations. In return they might expect to influence
outcomes. If policies can be broadly categorized as either distributive or regulatory, DGs can
be distinguished by which of these policy types they mainly deal with. As described above
when discussing Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical framework, distribu-
tive policies require public spending whereas regulations address the behavior of certain actors.
Since the Commission is a democratic institution, it depends on having democratic legit-
imacy. This can take on different forms. Output legitimacy involves the quality of policies.
Input legitimacy relates to making decisions that are supported by the public. DGs will have
a demand for mainly input or output legitimacy based on whether they primarily deal with
regulatory or distributive policies. Based on this, they have different demands for informa-
tion. Output legitimacy goes hand in hand with technical information, which may enhance the
quality of the policies. Input legitimacy is associated with political information concerning the
public opinion (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013, pp. 1105-1106, 1108-1109).
This theoretical perspective thus adds the DGs to the equation. DGs that primarily prepare
regulatory proposals are assumed to need output legitimacy and demand technical information.
This work requires specialized knowledge in the relevant fields that are going to be regulated.
For instance, if the Commission is working on a proposal concerning the regulation of some
specific aspect of light bulbs, input from experts on lighting may enhance the quality of the
proposal. Distributive DGs are assumed to mostly need input legitimacy and therefore demand
political information. Distributive policies are generally more politicized and less technically
complex compared to regulations (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013, pp. 1105-1106, 1108-1109). An
example here is a consultation regarding the EU’s state aid, where what the public thinks may
be pertinent.
Interest groups are on the supply side. It is assumed that civil society groups generally
are able to supply more political than technical information. Civil society groups represent
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more diffuse and broader interests than for instance business groups. They will therefore have
information about what one part of the public – their constituency – will accept. For example,
interest groups which favor a lesser role for the EU are able to supply information about what
this constituency will accept concerning state aid levels. This relates to input legitimacy – what
distributive DGs are assumed to mainly be demanding.
Business groups, on the other hand, are assumed to chiefly offer technical know-how. They
usually represent a narrower set of interests pertaining to economic or occupational areas and
likely possess technical expertise about their specific field (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013, pp. 1105-
1106, 1108-1109). Given a regulatory proposal concerning light bulbs, business groups repre-
senting light bulb manufacturers are likely to have an inkling of how the proposition will affect
their industry in practice. The different expectations are summarized in Figure 2.1.
 
Regulatory DGs 
Distributive DGs 
Output legitimacy 
Input legitimacy 
Technical information 
Political information 
Business groups 
Civil society 
groups 
Figure 2.1: DGs’ demand for legitimacy and information and interest groups’ supply
From this, it follows that the distribution of interests in consultations organized by both
types of DGs are expected to be biased. Consultations organized by distributive DGs are ex-
pected to be biased towards civil society interests. They demand political information, which
mainly civil society groups are assumed to supply. Consultations organized by regulatory DGs,
on the other hand, are expected to be biased towards business interests. They demand technical
information, which mainly business groups are assumed to supply.
Hypothesis 2a Consultations organized by DGs mainly concerned with regulatory matters are
biased towards business interests.
Hypothesis 2b Consultations organized by DGs mainly concerned with distributive matters
are biased towards civil society interests.
This is one of the hypotheses for which a dependent variable measure that considers the
direction of the bias is needed. The point is not to examine whether the consultations organized
by regulatory DGs are more biased than ones organized by distributive DGs, but whether the
direction of the bias is different.
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As for relevant empirical results, Coen & Katsaitis (2013, pp. 1110-1111) examine hypothe-
ses related to the supply and demand for information. Their unit of analysis is business and civil
society groups which have self-registered in the Commission’s Register of Interest Represen-
tatives. They examine whether business groups have registered the policy areas that regulatory
DGs deal with as fields of interest in this register. The same is done for civil society groups and
distributive DGs. Coen & Katsaitis (2013, pp. 1111-1114) find a correlation between the two.
Business groups have mainly registered the same policy areas as those regulatory DGs work
with. Civil society groups and distributive DGs also have concurrent interests.
However, the hypothesis has not been examined with regards to a specific activity, such
as online consultations. There are fewer costs associated with self-registering as an interest
representative than there is to actually participate. The picture emerging from Coen & Kat-
saitis’ (2013) study may be more optimistic than what is the case for participatory activities.
Moreover, there are some potential problems with the measurement validity in the study. There
are no limits on how many policy domains the actors can select as interesting (Coen & Kat-
saitis, 2013, p. 1110). This can result in a skewed correlation. The registered actors can have
ticked off many areas as relevant, when in reality they are more specialized (Greer et al., 2008,
pp. 427-428). Examining the abovementioned hypothesis in relation to online consultations
can therefore illuminate whether the results hold when these aspects are different.
2.2.3 EU activity
Moving on to the new, broader cost-benefit perspective added in this thesis, several studies have
suggested and found that there is a connection between the levels of government activity and
interest group activity (Coen, 2007, p. 336; Greenwood, 1997, p. 9; Mahoney, 2004, pp. 457,
460; Rasmussen et al., 2014, p. 255). Applying this insight here, EU activity may have an effect
on the degree of bias. Interest groups have limited resources. Assuming that one of their goals
is to be heard and have influence, they will attempt to sway the decision-makers in the EU. One
way to do this is by contributing to online consultations (Quittkat & Kotzian, 2011, pp. 404-
405). To make the most of this strategy, it may be more relevant to contribute to consultations
pertaining to areas where the EU is more active.
In the areas where the EU is less active, it potentially also shares competences with the
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member states or only have a supporting function. Less might be gained by participating in
consultations that fall in these policy areas, because the EU does not make binding decisions
here. Participating in these consultations is therefore assumed to be more relevant for those
that are affected to a large degree, as for instance an indirect strategy to gain influence at the
national level. For groups that are less affected, a more cost-effective strategy could be to seek
influence at the national level instead. Consultations in areas where the EU is less active are
therefore expected to be more biased. At the EU level, resources can be more wisely used by
contributing to consultations in areas where the EU is more active and makes binding decisions.
All affected groups may therefore be more inclined to contribute in consultations that fall in
areas where the EU is more active, resulting in less biased participation here.
Hypothesis 3 Consultations in areas where the EU is less active are more biased than consul-
tations in areas where the EU is more active.
Of relevant previous research pertaining to this hypothesis, Mahoney (2004, p. 460) finds
a strong correlation between interest group activity and EU activity. EU activity is measured
as the number of staff in each of the Commission’s DGs. In areas with a higher number of
employees, there is generally more registered interest groups. The lobby register of the Com-
mission – Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society (CONECCS) – is used
to measure interest group activity (Mahoney, 2004, p. 445). In contrast to the register used by
Coen & Katsaitis (2013, p. 1110) described above, the groups that have chosen to register in
CONECCS are regularly participating in committees or hearings organized by the Commission
(Wonka et al., 2010, p. 464). However, committees and hearings may not be as open as online
consultations since participation usually requires an invitation. Online consultations are, on the
other hand, generally open for everyone (Quittkat & Kotzian, 2011, p. 402). Exploring this
hypothesis therefore sheds light on activity’s effect on bias in a specific participatory activity,
and one that is a most likely case for unbiased participation in addition.
Furthermore, Rasmussen et al. (2014, pp. 259-260) find that more legislative activity gener-
ally leads to a higher number of interest group participants. Again, the focus is on the number
of groups rather than the distribution of interests. As argued in relation to the salience variable,
however, a correlation between activity and the number of interest group participants could also
imply that activity affects the degree of bias.
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2.2.4 Resource demanding consultations
Some characteristics may make participating in consultations more resource demanding, af-
fecting the groups’ cost-benefit analyses in a similar vein as with the degree of EU activity.
Contributing to online consultations requires time and information, and potentially staff or
money to obtain relevant information (Quittkat, 2011, pp. 660, 668). Here, how the format
of a consultation and how technically complex it is make participating more or less resource
demanding is elaborated upon.
Format
The format of a consultation is one of the features that might affect how resource demanding
contributing is. Contributing to a standardized consultation, where one is to fill out a question-
naire, may require fewer resources than participating in non-standardized consultations, where
the questions are open-ended. First of all, filling out standardized questionnaires likely requires
less time. Checking a box is less time-consuming than formulating an answer to a question.
Second, standardized questionnaires require less information since the starting point is not a
blank sheet. The possible answers can act as a frame and provide guidance. This implies that
one can participate even without much prior knowledge about the particular subject of a con-
sultation (Quittkat, 2011, pp. 661-662, 665). Standardized consultations therefore open up for
more positive cost-benefit analyses compared to non-standardized ones. Less affected interests
might be more likely to contribute, resulting in less biased participation.
Hypothesis 4 Non-standardized consultations are more biased than standardized consulta-
tions.
This has been examined empirically in relation to participation rates, but not the distribution
of substantive interests. Quittkat (2011, pp. 656-657) finds that all types of actors are more
prone to participate in standardized online consultations (Quittkat, 2011, pp. 661-662, 665).
That all types of actors are more prone to participate indicates that the actor bias is lower,
which Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 454) find is associated with a low degree of participation
bias. This implies that the format of a consultation could affect the distribution of interests as
well. Moreover, Quittkat (2011, pp. 656-657) only include online consultations organized by
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two particular DGs. These were chosen for their eagerness to involve civil society, and may
therefore display the most optimistic tendencies. This thesis includes a wider range of DGs,
making the results more general.
Technical complexity
The technical complexity of a consultation is another aspect that may affect how resource de-
manding participating is. Technical complexity is defined by the participants’ need to possess
specialized knowledge to be able to participate in a meaningful way (Gormley, 1986, p. 598;
Ringquist et al., 2003, p. 145). It thus refers to the content of a consultation, and not the
consultation process. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 447) highlight the aspect of technical
complexity when distinguishing between policy types, mentioning that regulations often are
more technically complex than distributive policies. They do not go beyond this mention, how-
ever, as is done here. How technical complexity can affect actors’ cost-benefit analyses and
their incentives to participate in lobbying have been explored previously (Broscheid & Coen,
2007, pp. 351-352, 358; Ferretti & Lener, 2008, p. 513; Quittkat, 2011, pp. 660-661; Steffek
& Ferretti, 2009, p. 47; Yackee & Yackee, 2006, p. 131). The theoretical insight from these
studies is here applied to participation bias in online consultations.
To understand the content of a technically complex consultation and be able to provide rel-
evant comments, interest groups with expertise in the given field have an advantage. They are
likely to already possess the relevant information needed to participate. For instance, interest
groups representing paper manufacturers can most likely easily participate in a consultation
concerning the chemicals contained in paper. To be able to participate without already pos-
sessing relevant information, resources like money or staff may be needed to gather it. This
will make contributing more costly. Less affected groups may in such a case find that the costs
exceed the potential benefits of contributing. This makes wide-ranging interest representation
in technically complex consultations less likely. Participating in less complex consultations,
on the other hand, is not assumed to require specialized knowledge. This makes them less
resource demanding, which opens up for more positive cost-benefit analyses and less biased
participation outcomes.
Hypothesis 5 Consultations concerning technically complex matters are more biased than
consultations concerning less complex matters.
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Technical complexity has not been explored systematically in relation to participation bias
previously. There are nevertheless some relevant case studies, examining e-participation rates
in consultations concerning the authorization of GMO products. This is a technically complex
area, where being able to bring relevant contributions to the table requires expertise. These
studies have shown that equal participation opportunities – openness – do not necessarily result
in participation from other actors than experts (Ferretti & Lener, 2008, pp. 507-508, 510-511,
521-522; Quittkat, 2011, pp. 660-661; Steffek & Ferretti, 2009, pp. 44, 47-49).
2.2.5 Technical complexity and salience
Technical complexity’s effect on bias may depend on how salient the content of a consultation
is. Gormley (1986, pp. 597-598, 603) develops a theory in the field of regulatory politics, where
the interaction between technical complexity and salience is in focus. As mentioned above,
salient issues are understood as issues that are prominent on the policy agenda and affect a
large number of people – the general public (Gormley, 1986, p. 598; Lowry & Joslyn, 2014,
p. 154). The theory is used to deduce which actors are likely to participate in policy processes
concerning regulations. Eshbaugh-Soha (2006, p. 239), however, finds that hypotheses derived
from the theory also hold water for other types of policies. It is therefore not necessarily
limited to regulatory politics. In other words, the theory can be used to derive expectations
regarding participation patterns in policy processes. Of the participants, citizen, business and
occupational groups are relevant here3 (Gormley, 1986, pp. 603-605).
Expectations about who will participate when are based on the different groups’ incentives
and abilities to engage in the policy process. This relates to the cost-benefit perspective –
participation depends on the groups’ resources and concerns. Citizen groups are expected to be
more likely to participate if the issues are salient but not complex. With technically complex
issues they face more barriers – they are not assumed to possess a lot of technical know-how.
They are, however, assumed to participate when issues are salient because they represent the
concerns of citizens (Gormley, 1986, p. 604). An example Gormley (1986, p. 600) uses here is
regulations concerning gun control. This issue is not especially technically complex, but it is
3Gormley (1986, pp. 603-605) includes “professionals”. Occupational groups organize professionals (Ras-
mussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 450), however, and this type of group is therefore relevant to operationalize these
participants here.
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highly relevant for the general public.
Concerning business groups, the expectation is that they will participate in the policy pro-
cess irrespective of the issue’s degree of technical complexity and salience. They are, however,
assumed to be especially prone to contribute if the issue is less salient. Business groups are
likelier to have the necessary resources – such as information, money or staff – to participate
in policy processes concerning technically complex issues, but their participation is expected
to be stigmatized. By participating in less salient consultations, they are not as likely to draw
attention to themselves (Gormley, 1986, pp. 604-605). Antitrust regulation is used by Gorm-
ley (1986, p. 600) as an example of an issue that is complex and less salient, and thus where
business groups would be expected to participate.
Lastly, occupational groups are expected to participate if the issue is technically complex
as well as salient. An example of such an issue is where power plants should be situated.
Occupational groups are likely to possess expertise in the field of the profession they represent.
They are therefore assumed to have the resources to participate in complex consultations. The
participation of occupational groups is furthermore not likely to be as frowned upon by the
public, since they are participating based on their expertise. This expertise may furthermore
help justify unpopular outcomes. They therefore do not need to shy away from participating in
consultations concerning salient matters (Gormley, 1986, pp. 600, 603-606).
Applied to the context of online consultations, participation bias is expected to vary with
a consultation’s degree of salience and technical complexity – an interaction effect. As sum-
marized in Table 2.1, each combination is expected to result in biased consultations, but in
different directions. The ensuing hypothesis is therefore also related to the direction of the
bias, rather than the general degree of it. Business groups are expected to participate in con-
sultations concerning less salient and both less complex and complex issues. Citizen groups
are expected to participate when issues are salient and less complex. Occupational groups are
expected to participate in consultations concerning technically complex and both less salient
and salient issues.
Hypothesis 6a Technically complex and salient, as well as complex and less salient, consulta-
tions are biased towards occupational interests.
Hypothesis 6b Technically complex and less salient, as well as less complex and less salient,
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Table 2.1: Technical complexity, salience and the direction of the bias
High degree of salience Low degree of salience
High degree of
technical complexity Occupational groups
Business and occupational
groups
Low degree of
technical complexity Citizen groups Business groups
consultations are biased towards business interests.
Hypothesis 6c Salient and less complex consultations are biased towards citizen interests.
Gormley’s (1986) theory has previously been applied in different contexts, such as the
political control of regulatory agencies (Ringquist et al., 2003, pp. 141-142, 144-146). The
ideas have to a lesser extent been applied in interest group studies (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2006,
p. 239), which will be the case here.
2.3 Summary of the expanded model
Table 2.2 shows all the variables included in the initial and new model. These two are merged
together, and this expanded model is used when running regression analyses. There are several
dependent variable measures, which are detailed in Chapter 3, since both the general degree
and the direction of the bias are explored. The same expanded model is used no matter the
dependent variable measure, however. Even though a variable is hypothesized to affect the
general degree of bias, it can potentially affect the direction of the bias as well – and vice versa.
Furthermore, Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 453) examine both the general degree of bias and
the bias towards business interests using their initial model – even though their expectations do
not concern the direction of the bias. Whether the new variables, that are expected to affect the
general degree of bias, also affect the bias towards business is therefore explored in this thesis.
As Table 2.2 shows, most of the variables are seen from the perspective of interest groups.
It is assumed that interest groups decide whether or not to participate based on mainly these
factors. Two of the variables – actor bias and DG type – are seen from other perspectives. The
actor bias variable is not connected directly to interest groups’ decision to participate or not.
Instead, it connects complexity in one area (actor bias) with complexity in another (participa-
tion bias) and is thus seen from more of a macro perspective. The DG type variable concerns
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Table 2.2: Variables, from which/whose perspective they are seen and their connection to the consultations
Initial
independent
variables
Policy type
Distributive or regulatory
Perspective: interest
groups
Consultations: content
Cost structure
Diffuse or concentrated
Perspective: interest
groups
Consultations: content
Actor bias
Distribution of the different
kinds of participating actors
Perspective: macro
Consultations: participants
Interest group density
Number of interest group
participants
Perspective: interest groups
Consultations: participants
New
independent
variables
DG
Type: distributive or
regulatory
Perspective: DGs, interest
groups
Consultations: organizer
DG
Activity
Perspective: interest groups
Consultations: organizer
Format
Degree of standardization
Perspective: interest groups
Consultations: directly
Technical complexity and
salience
(Separate and interaction
terms)
Perspective: interest groups
Consultations: content
Dependent
variable
(participation
bias)
General degree of bias
Distribution of the diff-
erent types of interest
groups participating in
the consultations
Direction of the bias
Proportion of business
group participants
Direction of the bias
Proportion of occupational
group participants
Direction of the bias
Proportion of civil society
group participants
the interest groups’ supply and DGs’ demand for information, and is arguably seen from both
the interest groups’ and DGs’ perspectives.
Table 2.2 also clarifies how the variables are connected to the consultations. Policy type,
cost structure, technical complexity and salience are connected to the consultations via their
content. Actor bias and interest group density are connected via their participants. DG type
and EU activity are connected to the consultations by way of their organizers. Lastly, the format
of the consultations concerns them more directly by way of the questions asked.
2.3.1 The chronological order of the variables
There is arguably some chronology in the ordering of the independent variables in the expanded
model. The hypothesized order is shown in Figure 2.2. Each consultation is announced on the
website of the DG that organizes it (Quittkat, 2011, p. 657), making the organizer its first
known characteristic. Whether the DGs mainly deal with regulatory or distributive matters, as
well as the EU activity in the policy area, is therefore determined before the other variables.
After these, the independent variables related more directly to the consultations can be said to
be determined. These are furthermore assumed to be more or less concurrent. Lastly, actor bias
and the number of interest group participants are assumed to be determined closer in time to
the dependent variable – participation bias – as discussed above. They are all related to who
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 DGs 
Type 
Activity 
Consultation content 
Policy type 
Cost structure 
Technical complexity 
Salience 
Technical complexity*salience 
Consultation format 
Participants 
Actor bias 
Interest group density 
Figure 2.2: Hypothesized chronological order of the independent variables
participates in the consultations.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, the theoretical framework has been presented and discussed. Rasmussen &
Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) theoretical framework, mainly based on pluralist ideas, was first
presented. The expectations derived from this are secondary in this thesis – space is instead
given to the new hypotheses. They are nevertheless kept since they have been found to affect
bias. Furthermore, alternative expectations were presented with regards to the initial policy type
and cost structure variables, based on the ideas in the transactions perspective. The actor bias
and interest group density expectations were moreover argued to be less interesting because of
their close proximity to the dependent variable. Second, an additional aspect – salience – based
on the same pluralistic reasoning was included in the expanded model.
Third, the new perspectives – an exchange theoretical and a cost-benefit one – were pre-
sented. These take the pluralistic framework one step further by considering when less affected
interests are likely to be represented. The resources needed to participate are the main theme.
Hypotheses concerning the type of DG organizing a consultation, EU activity, the format and
technical complexity of a consultation, as well as an interaction between salience and com-
plexity are derived from these perspectives. Most of them concern the general degree of bias,
but two concern the direction of it. A demarcation is therefore made between what is likely to
affect the degree and direction of bias in this thesis. All the variables are, however, included in
one expanded model.
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3 Data and variable measures
Having introduced the theoretical framework and hypotheses in the previous chapter, the prac-
ticalities related to examining these hypotheses are presented in this chapter. First, the datasets
and adequacy of the sample size are discussed. Information about the population and sample is
then provided, and potential systematic differences between them are considered. The coding
of the data is subsequently described. Second, how the dependent and independent variables
are measured is discussed. Some of the new independent variables get two measures, with the
second one serving as a robustness check. Lastly, the control variables are described.
3.1 Data and coding
In this section, the data and coding process are described. First, the datasets and how the new
consultations were identified are presented. Whether the sample size is adequate is addressed
by testing the statistical power to detect effects of different sizes. Second, the population and
sample are discussed. Lastly, the coding process is described.
3.1.1 Data
Two datasets are used. The first one is Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 445, 449-450) dataset,
which includes consultations from between December 2001 and April 2010 (N = 210). The
second dataset is an expanded version of this, where consultations up to and including August
2011 are added. The online consultations organized after Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 449)
cutoff point were identified in June 2014 by using the “Your Voice in Europe”-website, as well
as the specific DG websites dedicated to online consultations. A total of 101 consultations
included identifiable information about the participants between April 2010 and August 2011.
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Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 450) forgo coding one consultation because it is an outlier in
terms of the number of received contributions. This is also the case for three1 of the 101 new
consultations. Overall, 98 new consultations are therefore added to the sample2. The total
number of consultations is thus expanded from 210 to 308.
More consultations were coded to make up for the new variables that are added to the
model. To evaluate whether the sample size is adequate given the number of variables (degrees
of freedom), power analysis can be used. Such an analysis indicates one’s ability to reject
a false null hypothesis – that there is no correlation when, in reality, there is. An analysis
with greater power is likelier to detect actual correlations compared to one with low power
(Osborne, 2013, pp. 20, 26). Examining this, the power to detect small effects is shown to
be poor. If there is a small correlation between the independent and dependent variables in
reality, the effect will only be detected around 20% of the time in the statistical analyses. Using
the same test for Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 455-456) sample reveals a similarly low
power (18%) to detect small effects. A power level of at least 80% is desirable (Osborne, 2013,
p. 26). To achieve this power level regarding small effects, a sample consisting of around 1,118
consultations would be needed. Coding this amount of consultations has not been possible
here, however, due to time constraints.
The power to detect medium-sized and large effects is much higher. The power levels here
are 0.99 and 1, respectively. This means that small effects are likely to go undetected because
of the limited sample size, whereas medium-sized or large effects almost certainly will be
detected. This is discussed further in the ensuing chapters.
3.1.2 Population, sample and representativeness
By expanding the cutoff point, the population in this thesis is every online consultation orga-
nized by the Commission between December 2001 and August 2011. Every possible consul-
tation organized in this time period has been included in the sample, following Rasmussen &
Carroll (2014, pp. 449-450). The ones that are not included are ones where information about
1One concerning a possible revision of the Tobacco Products Directive received over 85,000 contributions,
another concerning a review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive received 4,200 contributions, and
the last one dealing with collective redress received 18,000 contributions (Directorate-General for Health and
Consumers, 2011, p. 6; Directorate-General for the Internal Market and Services, 2011; Hess et al., 2011, p. 4).
2The participation bias in these consultations could still be affected by the factors discussed in this thesis. They
have not been coded and this can therefore not be investigated.
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the participants has not been published, and ones that are no longer available online. The par-
ticipant information is necessary to be able to measure the dependent variable, bias. Without
knowing who participated, it is not possible to identify the distribution of the different types of
interest group participants. This information can be missing because the Commission has not
published the results of a consultation, or because the contributions are anonymous. This is, for
instance, usually the case when standardized questionnaires are used. Furthermore, the consul-
tations have to be available online to be able to code any of the variable measures. The ones
that have been deleted or lost when websites are changed or moved are therefore not included
in the sample.
The sample has thus not been randomly drawn. There might therefore be systematic dif-
ferences between those included in the sample compared to the population. There are few
indications that this is the case when it comes to the consultations that are still available on-
line compared to those that are not. One potential difference here could be that some DGs are
more prone to remove consultations from the Internet compared to other DGs. Based on the
Commission’s list of online consultations, this does not seem to be the case, however. There
furthermore does not seem to be a pattern when it comes to unpublished results.
The sample also differs from the population in that information about the participants has
to be available. There may be systematic differences between consultations where information
is disclosed and those where this is not the case. First of all, consultations without participant
information often make use of standardized questionnaires which renders participants anony-
mous. The consultations in the sample might therefore differ systematically from the ones
in the population when it comes to the format of them. The consultations not included are
more likely to be standardized. This can also mean that the consultations in the sample have
a systematically higher degree of actor bias compared to the ones that are not included. As
mentioned, Quittkat (2011, pp. 661-662) finds that standardized consultations are more likely
to lead to participation from a wider range of actors.
Given that the consultations that are not included in the sample are more likely to be stan-
dardized and have a lower degree of actor bias, a wider range of interests might be represented
as well. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 454) find that a low degree of actor bias is associated
with less biased consultations. If the non-included consultations are likely to be characterized
by lower degrees of actor bias in general, this effect could potentially be even stronger in the
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population as a whole. Furthermore, if standardized consultations are found to lead to less
biased participation patterns as well, the effect could likewise have been even stronger if the
standardized consultations in the population could have been included.
Overall, these factors imply that the sample may not be entirely representative of the pop-
ulation of online consultations. They might differ from each other when it comes to format
and actor bias, which potentially means that they are different when it comes to the degree of
participation bias as well. However, there are no indications that there are other systematic dif-
ferences between the consultations included in the sample and those that are not. The sample
might therefore still be representative of the population with regards to the other variables.
3.1.3 Coding
Since both new observations and variables are added, coding these has been necessary. The
data in the initial dataset were coded by “two independent human coders” (Rasmussen & Car-
roll, 2014, p. 450), with an additional coder who dealt with disagreements between the main
ones. This should ensure inter-coder reliability with consistently coded measures. All the new
variable measures, and all the measures for the new observations, were coded by the author.
This was done intermittently between September 2014 and the beginning of March 2015. Given
that the coding of some of the measures requires the use of judgment, the data was coded for a
second time between the end of March and in April 2015. The first coding is the one used in the
analyses. The second coding is used to evaluate whether the measures have been consistently
coded, in other words the reliability (Bryman, 2004, pp. 70-71). Having an independent sec-
ond coder would be preferable, but has not been a possibility here. At least one month passed
between the two codings to ensure some independence between them. The results generally in-
dicate that the intra-coder reliability is good. The cost structure measure scores slightly below
the threshold for what is considered satisfactory, however. The reliability of each measure will
be elaborated upon below.
To code the initial variable measures, the instructions presented in Rasmussen & Carroll’s
(2014, pp. 450, 453) paper and their accompanying codebook were used. The new measures
were coded according to a new codebook developed by the author, which can be found in
the appendix. Coding the independent variable measures was for the most part straightforward.
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The ones involving an element of judgment were more challenging, however, which is reflected
in the intra-coder reliability of these measures. In addition, finding information about the con-
sultations in the initial sample proved difficult in cases where the relevant consultation websites
were no longer accessible. They were often retrievable via the Internet Archive, but at other
times no information could be found, resulting in missing values.
3.2 Variable measures
How the variables are measured and coded is discussed in this section. The dependent vari-
able measures are first presented and discussed, including the preparatory steps involved in the
coding of them. The operationalizations of the initial and new independent variables are then
detailed. Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 453-454) measures are maintained in this thesis.
They are fairly straightforward and common. The measurement validity – whether the oper-
ationalizations measure the concepts they are intended to measure (Adcock & Collier, 2001,
pp. 529-531) – are therefore assumed to be good. Using the same measures also has the advan-
tage of making the statistical results comparable to the initial ones.
3.2.1 The dependent variable
The dependent variable, bias, refers to the distribution of different types of interests in a given
consultation (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 446). This is operationalized based on the interest
group participants. If every type of group is represented equally, it is by definition unbiased.
If this is not the case, the consultation is defined as biased. To be able to measure this, some
preparatory coding is needed. This is discussed below, before detailing the specific dependent
variable measures.
Preparatory steps
To measure participation bias, it is necessary to define and separate interest groups from the
other types of participants. The participants in the online consultations are therefore divided
into different actor categories. Each contributor is classified as a company, public organiza-
tion, European body or institution, private person, interest group, international organization or
“other” (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 450).
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An interest group is defined as “(...) an association of individuals or organizations, usually
formally organized, that on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence
public policy” (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 450), which is Encyclopedia Britannica’s def-
inition. There is no main agreed upon definition of interest groups in the literature. However,
two others, which are put forward in the context of trying to arrive at one unifying definition,
are similar to the one used here. Interest groups are defined as organizations that try to influ-
ence public policy, but do not compete in elections (Beyers et al., 2008, p. 1106; Yoho, 1998,
pp. 231-234). Yoho (1998, pp. 233-234) also adds that interest groups are non-governmental.
This aspect is also implicitly used by Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 450). When classifying
the participants, public organizations and interest groups are two distinct types of actors.
These two alternative definitions are similar to the one used by Rasmussen & Carroll (2014,
p. 450). Their definition can therefore be described as a fairly standard, behavioral one. It fo-
cuses on what interest groups do rather than organizational aspects such as membership (Baroni
et al., 2014, pp. 143-144). Using an organizational definition would be unnecessarily restrictive
in this context. The point is to be able to discern which interests are being represented, which
both non-member and member groups grant.
After determining which type of actor each participant in a given consultation is, the interest
groups among them are further divided into seven categories. These are trade and other busi-
ness groups, occupational groups, trade unions, public interests groups, identity groups, groups
including public authorities as members and “other” interest groups (Rasmussen & Carroll,
2014, p. 450). A few of these types are not as obvious as the others, and merit some additional
comments. Occupational groups gather people who have the same profession that requires
higher education, such as investment managers or police officers. Trade unions differ from
these by collectively negotiating on behalf of their members. Public interests include groups
that are concerned with the environment, consumer rights, civil liberties, government reform
or tax reform, among others. Identity groups represent interests based on race, ethnicity, na-
tionality, religion, age, sexual orientation or gender (Schlozman et al., 2012, pp. 326, 328, 333,
336).
Using this classification scheme allows for a more fine-grained categorization of the inter-
est group participants based on substantive categories. This is fitting because the dependent
variable is meant to measure the distribution of different types of interest group participants
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in consultations. More categories therefore make for a more specific measure of participation
bias.
For the 98 new consultations coded by the author, each actor was classified based on infor-
mation found on the participant’s website. Alternative sources, such as the actor’s contribution,
were used in cases where no website was found. Second, to code the substantive interests an
interest group represents, Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 450-451) population dataset was
used. In this dataset, the interest groups registered in the EU’s Transparency Register are coded
according to the interest group type scheme described above. This makes coding the task of
finding its assigned group type code in this dataset. The groups that are not registered here
were classified based on information found on their websites.
Dependent variable measures
These two preparatory steps – classifying the actors and interest groups – are done to be able
to measure the dependent variable, participation bias. Bias is measured in two different ways
by Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 453). The first measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), and the second is the proportion of business group participants in the consultations. HHI
is calculated by taking the sum of the squared interest group type proportions for each consul-
tation. The index ranges from a minimum of 1/7, where each of the seven interest group types
are participating to an equal degree, to a maximum of 1, where only one type of interest group
is participating. Higher values therefore equal a more biased participation pattern (Rasmussen
& Carroll, 2014, p. 453).
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 451-453) use the proportion measure to gauge whether any
of their variables affect the bias towards business. This is done since lobbying is often posited
as being dominated by business interests. The proportion of business participants is based
on the sum of the trade and business as well as occupational group participants. Occupational
groups are included because it makes for a more effective measure (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014,
p. 453), and likely because this type of group also represents interests related to the economic
sphere. This proportion measure is also useful to examine one of the specific hypotheses related
to the direction of the bias. This is H2a, that consultations organized by regulatory DGs are
biased towards business interests.
H2b and H6 also concern the direction of the bias. The two initial dependent variable
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measures are less useful here, however. New proportion measures are therefore used in these
cases. H2b and H6c concern the bias towards civil society and citizen interests, respectively.
These are here defined by concerning the collective, more diffuse interests of a large number
of individuals, and by not being related to occupational or other professional interests (Berry,
1999, p. 369; Pollack, 1997, pp. 572-573). Of the interest group types in this thesis, identity
and public interests are relevant to capture this. Both types decidedly represent non-economic,
more diffuse interests. Using the proportion of identity and public interests group participants
therefore makes it possible to examine whether the bias is tending towards civil society and
citizen interests. Lastly, H6a and H6b concern bias towards business and occupational inter-
ests, respectively. The initial business proportion measure merges these two types of groups,
whereas they are considered separately in the mentioned sub-hypotheses. Two separate mea-
sures are therefore coded. One for the proportion of trade and business group participants, and
one for the proportion of occupational group participants.
The intra-coder reliability is high for all of the dependent variable measures. The HHI mea-
sure has an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.94, whereas the ICC for the proportion
of business and occupational group participants is 0.99. For the three new proportion measures,
the ICC is 1 for business groups, 0.99 for occupational groups and 0.98 for civil society and
citizen groups. Some of the participants have in other words been coded differently the second
time around, but the majority are consistently coded.
3.2.2 Independent variables
How the independent variables are operationalized and the reliability of the measures are dis-
cussed here. The measures of the initial independent variables are first presented, before dis-
cussing the operationalizations of the new ones added in this thesis.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s variable measures
The independent variables in the initial model are interest group density, policy type, cost
structure and actor bias. How these are measured is briefly described here, as well as how
reliably they are coded for the new consultations included in the sample. The measures are
summarized in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1: Rasmussen & Carroll’s independent variable measures
Variable Measure
Interest group
density
Number of interest group participants.
Policy type
Expenditure: costs are covered by the EU
or the member states.
Regulatory: costs are covered by private
actors.
Administrative: no significant costs.
Cost structure
Diffuse: costs are spread among several
industries, sectors or taxpayers.
Concentrated: costs are limited to a small
number of industries or sectors.
Actor bias Sum of the squared actor type proportions.
The first variable mentioned – density – is measured as the number of interest group par-
ticipants, in hundreds, in each consultation (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, pp. 448, 453). The
intra-coder reliability is high, with an ICC of 0.998. The measure of the second variable – pol-
icy type – is categorical. The policy proposal a given consultation concerns is categorized as an
expenditure, regulatory or administrative one. Expenditure policies involve costs meant to be
covered mainly by the EU or the member states, whereas the costs of regulations are covered
by private actors. Administrative policies do not involve any significant costs (Kardasheva,
2009, p. 115; Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, pp. 447, 453). The Scott’s pi and Cohen’s kappa
reliability coefficients for this measure are 0.77, which is low but acceptable. The cost aspect
of a proposal is often not mentioned explicitly in the consultation document or elsewhere, and
the coder therefore has to make a judgment. As evident by the relatively low reliability coeffi-
cient, this is not always straightforward. A clearer operationalization could therefore have been
useful here, to establish the trustworthiness of the data to a larger degree.
The third variable is the cost structure. To measure this, the costs of the policy proposal
a given consultation concerns are classified as either diffuse or concentrated. The structure is
diffuse if the costs are spread among several industries, sectors or taxpayers in general. If the
costs are limited to a small number of industries or sectors, the cost structure of the proposal
is concentrated (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 447). The coding of this measure is done
in two steps. First, the actors the proposal is directed at are identified. Second, the coder
evaluates whether the costs are diffuse or concentrated (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 453).
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This procedure makes the classification more deliberate, since step one requires the coder to
consider how many actors are affected by the consultation’s subject matter. The intra-coder
reliability is still slightly below what is considered acceptable, with a Scott’s pi and Cohen’s
kappa coefficient of 0.67.
The reason for this is that the costs of the proposals are not always explicitly mentioned,
and coding the measure thus involves some judgment. This is also mentioned by Rasmussen
& Carroll (2014, p. 453), and is the reason why the coding procedure is done in two steps.
The exact number that constitutes several or few sectors or industries are not explicitly clear,
and up to the coder to judge. This operationalization therefore makes it harder to reliably code
the data. A clearer cost structure measure could therefore be advantageous to ensure more
consistent coding, and thus more trustworthy data.
The final independent variable in the initial model is actor bias. This measure is based on
the seven different actor types3. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used, here calculated as
the sum of the squared actor type proportions (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, pp. 447-448, 453).
The intra-coder reliability for this measure is high, with an ICC of 0.99.
New variable measures
The new independent variables that are added in this thesis are the format of a consultation, the
type of DG organizing it, EU activity, technical complexity and salience. How each of these
is operationalized is summarized in Table 3.2. The first variable – the format of a consulta-
tion – relates to the questions the Commission wants answered. These are usually presented in
the accompanying consultation document. If the questions are closed-ended, and the partici-
pants are meant to tick boxes, the consultation is classified as standardized. Non-standardized
consultations have open questions, where the participants have to formulate their own answers.
Consultations containing a mixture of both closed-ended and open questions are coded as semi-
standardized (Quittkat, 2011, p. 661). The intra-coder reliability for this measure is good; the
Cohen’s kappa and Scott’s pi coefficients are both 0.88. The inconsistency arises from judging
whether a consultation is semi-standardized or open in cases where the consultation document
is no longer available online. The format then has to be derived from other sources, such as the
3These are companies, public organizations, European bodies or institutions, individuals, international organi-
zations, interest groups and “others”.
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contributions received or the published results.
Table 3.2: New independent variable measures
Variable Measure(s)
Format
Whether the questions the Commission wants answered are open,
closed-ended or a mixture of both.
DG type
1. Broscheid and Coen’s (2007) categorization of regulatory and
distributive DGs.
2. The proportion of distributive consultations each DG has orga-
nized.
Activity
1. Each DG’s number of staff.
2. Legislative activity in the policy area a consultation falls in.
Technical
complexity
How technically complex the policy area a consultation falls in is.
Salience
The EU level percentage of respondents who find a certain issue
one of the two most important ones facing their country at the
moment. Each consultation is linked to one issue.
The second variable concerns the organizers of the consultations, the DGs, and whether
they mainly deal with regulatory or distributive matters. The DG that announces the consul-
tation on their website is considered the organizer, following Quittkat (2011, p. 656). Each
DG is classified as regulatory or distributive based on Broscheid & Coen’s (2007, p. 354, 362)
scheme. This is originally used in the context of exploring why the number of interests groups
differs between different policy domains (Broscheid & Coen, 2007, p. 347). Three DGs –
Budget, Informatics and Secretariat-General – that have organized online consultations are left
uncategorized here, however.
To classify these, I use Kardasheva’s (2009, pp. 102-103, 116) grouping of legislative pro-
posals4 in the EU between 1999 and 2007. Of the proposals that DG Budget made, 94.3% are
classified as distributive. DG Secretariat-General, on the other hand, made 30% distributive
proposals. The rest are categorized as either regulatory or administrative ones. DG Budget is
therefore grouped among the distributive DGs, whereas DG Secretariat-General is classified as
regulatory. Kardasheva (2009, p. 116) does not include DG Informatics in her sample. Based
on the information this DG presents on its website, it is coded as regulatory since it mainly
4The 973 legislative proposals Kardasheva (2009, pp. 102-103) classifies are ones where the European Par-
liament have proposed amendments, because she examines the EP’s influence on policy outcomes. She does not
categorize all of the 1,465 legislative proposals in her sample. This might bias the results of the classification, if for
instance either regulatory or distributive proposals generally are more contentious and likely to incite amendment
proposals from the EP. However, the resulting classification of the DGs corresponds to what one would expect
based on the DGs’ responsibilities.
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deals with administrative matters related to the EU institutions (Directorate-General for Infor-
matics (DIGIT), 2014). The intra-coder reliability for this measure is 1, indicating that the first
and second coding is fully consistent.
One issue with this measure, however, is that the DGs that are classified as regulatory here
might mainly organize distributive consultations, or vice versa. If this is the case, the measure
might not adequately capture the theoretical concept – the type of information demanded – in
this context. An alternative measure, specifically related to the online consultations each DG
has organized, is therefore also used. This is done to examine whether the results are robust.
Inspired by Kardasheva (2009, p. 123), the number of consultations concerning distributive
matters each DG has organized is divided by its total number of consultations. The intra-coder
reliability here is high, with an ICC of 0.975.
The third new variable is EU activity – consultations in areas where the EU is less active
are expected to be more biased. Activity is measured as the organizing DG’s number of staff,
with more employees indicating more activity, following Mahoney (2004, pp. 457, 460). The
intra-coder reliability for this measure is good. The ICC is 0.986.
Ideally, each consultation would be ascribed the organizing DG’s number of staff for the
year the consultation was organized7. I have only been able to find staff numbers from 2006
and 2009, however (Broscheid & Coen, 2007, pp. 362-363; European Commission, 2009). This
means that changes in activity levels over time will be poorly reflected. An alternative measure
is therefore used to check the robustness of the results. Rasmussen et al. (2014, pp. 255-256,
259) measure government activity as legislative activity in their study of the Commission’s
online consultations. Each consultation is given the number of passed regulations, directives
and decisions in the policy area it falls in.
I use Toshkov’s (2013) policy area specific dataset of EU’s legislative production for this.
The policy areas are based on the 20 different directory codes used in EUR-Lex, EU’s legisla-
tion database. Each consultation is connected to one of these based on its content. If it concerns
5The policy type measure described above is the basis for the number of distributive consultations a DG
has organized. The slightly inconsistent coding of this measure is the reason why the DG type measure is not
completely consistently coded.
6This is the result of an error. The consultations from 2006 are consistently coded with staff numbers from
2009 – not 2006 – in the first coding. This error is not repeated the second time around. Fixing this error, and
running the regressions anew, does not change the conclusions related to the hypothesis, however.
7The staff numbers for a given year are published in January (European Commission, 2009), making lagging
unnecessary.
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a regulation, directive or decision, it is ascribed to the policy area the act is classified under in
EUR-Lex. Otherwise, the category I deem most relevant is chosen. The consultation is then
given the number of legislative acts in this policy area from the year prior to when it was or-
ganized. Lagging ensures that the activity levels precede the consultation in time (Rasmussen
et al., 2014, p. 259). This measure has also been coded twice, and the resulting ICC is 0.93.
This indicates that the consistency between the first and second coding is high, even though an
element of judgment is involved in the process.
The fourth new variable is the technical complexity of a consultation, which is defined by
the participants’ need to possess specialized knowledge to be able to participate (Gormley,
1986, p. 598; Ringquist et al., 2003, p. 145). This is measured based on the complexity of
the policy area a consultation falls in. Jakobsen & Mortensen (2014, pp. 1-2, 10-12) do this
in a Danish context when examining how political factors affect rule production. They “(...)
categorize policy domains based on a pragmatic evaluation of the degree to which it is required
to have technical knowledge of the domain to be able to design effective rules.” (Jakobsen
& Mortensen, 2014, p. 12). I use their classification as guidance when categorizing the DGs
based on whether they mainly deal with technically complex or less complex matters. This
means that consultations organized by DG Taxation and Customs Union, for instance, are coded
as technically complex since they concern tax or customs matters. Jakobsen & Mortensen’s
(2014, p. 12) classification builds on previous similar ones. The measure should therefore be
able to capture the concept of technical complexity to a reasonable degree. This measure is
consistently coded with Cohen’s kappa and Scott’s pi coefficients of 1.
An alternative measure of technical complexity could be the number of pages of the con-
sultation document, inspired by Yackee & Yackee (2006, p. 128, 132-133) and Jakobsen &
Mortensen (2014, p. 12) who use the length of rules to measure technical complexity. The
consultation document contains information about the proposal, questions and other relevant
instructions. However, most consultation documents are more or less the same length whether
they in reality are likely to be technically complex or less so8. This might be because the DGs
have instructions to keep the document within a certain limit, or that there is a more general
norm for how long it should. Furthermore, not every consultation document follows the same
8For example, the document for a consultation concerning short selling is 18 pages long compared to 16 for a
consultation concerning less bureaucracy for citizens.
47
formula. Some only include the consultation questions, for instance. What at first sight might
look like a forthright measure, is therefore not found to be suited for the purposes.
The final variable in the expanded model is salience. Issues are defined as salient if they are
prominent on the policy agenda and affect a large number of people (Gormley, 1986, p. 598;
Lowry & Joslyn, 2014, p. 154). One way to measure this is as the media attention to a given
policy area at the EU level, as for instance Neshkova (2014, pp. 22-23) does. This is not done
here, however, since it is unclear whether a European public opinion exists and not just separate
national ones (Rasmussen et al., 2014, pp. 256-257).
Instead, I follow the example of Rasmussen et al. (2014, p. 258) who device a salience
measure to use in their study of the Commission’s online consultations. Starting in 2003,
Eurobarometer surveys include a question where respondents – citizens in the EU member
states – are asked to choose what they consider to be the two most important issues their country
faces at the moment. To do this, they are presented with a list of 15 issues. The salience measure
is based on the answers to this question. Each consultation is linked, based on its content, to
one of the policy areas. It is then given the EU level percentage9 of respondents who consider
this one of the two most important issues. The measure is lagged by one year to ensure that
the salience levels precede the consultation in time. The intra-coder reliability for the measure
is fairly high with an ICC of 0.88. This reflects that the coder’s judgment is involved in the
coding through linking the consultations to a policy area.
One limitation with this salience measure is that the subject matter of some consultations
does not, or barely, fit into one of the 15 categories that the respondents can choose from. The
additional “other” category is used when none of the others are deemed relevant. This is the
same strategy Rasmussen et al. (2014, online appendix A) use. In addition, the question was
first included in the Eurobarometer surveys in 2003. Consultations organized before this point
are given the numbers from 2003 as a substitute. This is not optimal, but the percentages for
most of the policy areas are fairly stable, indicating that it is not likely to be too much of a
stretch. Despite these disadvantages, the measure is an adequate solution. It should be able
to capture the first part of the salience concept fairly well – the importance the general public
attaches to an issue. The second part – prominence on the policy agenda – might not be captured
9These are reported in the Eurobarometer reports and are made up of the average values for each member state,
weighted according to population size.
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as well with this operationalization. However, the list of possible issues the respondents can
choose from are all fairly prominent. Examples are the economic situation, crime, terrorism
and the environment. Both salience aspects are therefore included to a reasonable degree.
3.3 Control variables
Three control variables are included in the statistical analyses as well. Two of these are from
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 454) and one is new. The first initial one is which year a consul-
tation was organized. The use of online consultations has increased over time, and a learning
effect might take place among potential participants. This can result in the mobilization of
a broader range of interests and thus less biased consultations over time (Rasmussen & Car-
roll, 2014, p. 454). The second initial control variable is the length of the consultation period.
This is measured as the number of weeks that passes from the date the consultation opens for
contributions to the submission deadline. A shorter consultation period can make contributing
challenging for groups that have to coordinate among their members before formulating an an-
swer. Shorter consultations periods can therefore lead to more biased consultations (Rasmussen
& Carroll, 2014, p. 454). Both of these control variables are consistently coded with reliability
coefficients of 1.
The new control variable concerns the openness of a consultation. The target groups of a
consultation are specified on each consultation’s website. Most are open for everyone, some
single out actors who are particularly welcome to contribute, whereas others only accept sub-
missions from specific actors (Quittkat, 2011, pp. 659-660). The initial sample includes consul-
tations with specific target groups, but this is not controlled for or otherwise taken into account.
The openness of a consultation might affect the degree of participation bias, however. Selective
consultations where some are singled out might dissuade non-targeted groups from participat-
ing, whereas closed consultations can disable groups from participating. In the latter case, the
Commission organizes bias by specifying who they seek submissions from (Beyers et al., 2008,
p. 1118). In addition to controlling for openness, three separate regressions are run for open,
selective and closed consultations. What affects bias in open consultations might be different
from selective or closed ones, because not everyone is equally welcome to contribute.
To measure openness, consultations are classified based on whether they are open for ev-
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eryone, selective or closed (Quittkat, 2011, pp. 653-654, 659-660). The intra-coder reliability
for this measure is acceptable, with Scott’s pi and Cohen’s kappa coefficients of around 0.80. In
some cases, a long list of actors is included in the target group-section, making it necessary to
judge whether the consultation is open for everyone or not. This is the reason why the measure
is not more consistently coded.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, the data, coding and operationalizations of the variables were discussed. The
sample has been expanded by 98 consultations to a total of 308. Every accessible online consul-
tation organized between December 2001 and August 2011, with available information about
the participants, is included in the sample. There might be some systematic differences between
the consultations included and those that are not, which limits the possibility of generalizing
the results to the population of online consultations as a whole.
The new observations have been coded twice by the author, and the intra-coder reliability
is overall good. However, the policy type and cost structure measures of Rasmussen & Carroll
(2014, p. 453) are less consistently coded because of the judgment involved in the process.
More explicit operationalizations could therefore have been useful here.
Two different kinds of dependent variable measures are used. The first is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, which is used to measure the general degree of bias. The second is four
different proportion measures, used to gauge the direction of the bias. For the initial inde-
pendent variables, Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 453) measures are kept. These are fairly
straightforward and the measurement validity is therefore assumed to be good. The new inde-
pendent variables are measured using operationalizations found in the interest group literature.
The two initial control variables are also used in this thesis, as well as a new one measuring the
openness of the consultations.
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4 Descriptive statistics, bivariate correla-
tions and statistical models
In this chapter, a first look at the data is provided. First, the descriptive statistics for the variable
measures described in the previous chapter are considered. Second, the bivariate correlations
between the independent and dependent variables are explored, to get an indication of whether
the hypotheses are supported. Lastly, the statistical models that are used are discussed. An
OLS and multilevel linear model are used when bias is measured as the HHI. Fractional regres-
sion models are used when the direction of the bias is examined using one of the proportion
measures.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variable measures, indicating how the data look, are presented in
this section. The distribution of the dependent variables is first considered, and is furthermore
compared to the distribution in the population. How the independent variable measures look is
then discussed.
4.1.1 Dependent variable measures
The first dependent variable measure, the HHI, ranges from around 0.18 to 1. In theory, the
lowest possible value is around 0.14. This would be a case where every type of group partic-
ipated to an equal degree. When bias is measured as the HHI, none of the consultations can
thus be described as completely unbiased. Figure 4.1a shows the slightly skewed distribution
of this measure. Most of the consultations are characterized by a somewhat biased participa-
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the HHI measure before and after transformation
tion pattern. There is also a fair concentration of consultations that are highly biased with a
HHI value of between 0.9 and 1. To get a more normally distributed measure1, a square root
transformation is found to be the most effective. The resulting distribution is shown in Figure
4.1b.
The distributions of the four different proportion measures, used to gauge the direction of
the bias, are shown in Figure 4.2. As can be seen, most of the consultations are characterized by
a high proportion of business and occupational group participants. Business is the main driver
here, as Figure 4.2b shows. Neither occupational nor civil society interests are as prominently
represented in consultations as business ones.
None of the dependent variable measures take the distribution of interests in the population
into account. To see whether any interests are under- or overrepresented in the consultations,
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 450-453) compare the distribution of interests in the consul-
tations to that of the population. The population is operationalized as the EU’s Transparency
Register, where interest groups active at the EU can self-register. All operationalizations of
interest group populations are bound to have flaws, but this is one of the better existing sources
(Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, pp. 450-451).
A table comparing the distributions can be found in the appendix. The comparison shows
that business interests are overrepresented in the consultations compared to the population, as
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 451-453) also find. Trade unions and groups including public
1This is done to fulfill an OLS requirement and is discussed below.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of the proportion measures
authorities as member are better represented in the consultations than in the population as well.
Public interests groups are, on the other hand, underrepresented in the consultations. These
results indicate that the representation of interests in online consultations are biased compared
to the population as well, and not just in the general sense that the dependent variable measures
capture.
4.1.2 Independent variable measures
Table 4.1 shows the minimum, maximum and mean values, as well as the standard deviation,
of each independent variable measure. First, the mean value of the salience measure is ap-
proximately 18, which is a fairly high degree of salience. The standard deviation of around 14
indicates variation as well, however. Second, both the main and robustness DG type measure,
with mean values of 0.08 and 0.21, respectively, show that most consultations are organized
by regulatory DGs. Third, the activity measures indicate that most consultations are orga-
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the independent variable measures
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev.
Salience 1 41 17.99 14.17
DG type 0 1 0.08 0.27
DG type:
Proportion of distri-
butive consultations
0 1 0.21 0.20
Activity:
DG staff
355 1,893 745.50 276.53
Activity:
Legislative activity
8 493 82.65 66.07
Format 0 2 1.84 0.37
Technical complexity 0 1 0.80 0.40
Policy type 1 3 1.61 0.80
Cost structure 0 1 0.55 0.50
Actor bias 0.23 0.92 0.40 0.11
Interest group density 0.01 4.29 0.45 0.53
nized by DGs with a high number of employees, or fall in policy areas where a fair amount
of legislation is passed. Fourth, the format statistics show that most of the consultations are
standardized. Only one of the consultations in the sample is completely standardized, and is
therefore merged with the semi-standardized ones to get a more representative comparison in
the subsequent analyses. Lastly, technical complexity ranges from 0 (less complex) to 1 (com-
plex). The mean value here is 0.8, which shows that most of the consultations fall in technically
complex policy areas.
The remaining four independent variable measures in Table 4.1 concern Rasmussen & Car-
roll’s (2014, pp. 447-448, 453) initial independent variables. First, the mean and standard
deviation of the policy type measure show that a fair amount of consultations concern regu-
latory proposals. Fewer are either distributive or administrative. Second, the cost structure
measure is more evenly distributed with a mean of 0.55. Nearly half are thus coded as diffuse
(0) and the other as concentrated (1). Third, the consultations are generally characterized by
some degree of actor bias and, as the low standard deviation shows, this does not vary much.
Lastly, the mean number of interest group participants in the consultations is 45, with a fair
amount of variation.
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4.2 Bivariate correlations
Exploring the bivariate correlations between the independent and dependent variables gives a
basic idea of whether the hypotheses are supported, and an indication of what the results of the
regression analyses will be. Here, the correlations related to the new hypotheses concerning
the general degree and direction of the bias are discussed. The bivariate correlations between
the initial independent and dependent variables are all in the expected direction. They are not
discussed, however, since the related expectations have been examined by Rasmussen & Carroll
(2014) previously. Priority is instead given to the new hypotheses. Furthermore, H6 concerns
an interaction effect and is therefore not considered here.
General degree of bias
The general degree of bias is measured using the square root transformed HHI measure. The
first of the new hypotheses, H1, concerns salience. The scatterplot, Figure 4.3a, shows that
it is not supported. Salient consultations are generally slightly more biased than less salient
ones, which is the opposite of the expected effect. Figure 4.3b shows the results related to
H4. Standardized consultations are expected to be less biased than non-standardized ones.
The mean of standardized and semi-standardized consultations is slightly lower than that of
non-standardized ones, lending some support to H4.
H3 states that consultations in areas where the EU is less active are more biased than con-
sultations in areas where the EU is more active. As can be seen in Figure 4.4a, the very slight
correlation is negative, as expected, when activity is measured as the number of DG employees.
However, the lowess line shows a non-linear correlation. Transforming the measure to take this
into account, results in a slightly positive correlation. As seen in Figure 4.4b, there is also a
very slight, positive correlation between activity and bias when using the robustness measure
of activity2. Overall, this does not lend support to H3.
Lastly, H5 is the expectation that technically complex consultations are more biased than
less complex ones. This is supported by the bivariate analysis. As Figure 4.5 shows, going
from less complex to technically complex consultations results in a relatively strong increase
2Transforming the measure to take the form of the lowess line into account, results in a slightly stronger
positive correlation.
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Figure 4.4: Bivariate correlation between activity and bias
in bias.
The direction of the bias
H2 concerns the direction of the bias and is divided in two parts. H2a expects that consultations
organized by regulatory DGs are biased towards business interests. This is supported, as can
56
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
Technical complexity
Bi
as
 (tr
a
n
sf
o
rm
e
d 
HH
I)
l
l
Less complex Complex
Figure 4.5: Bivariate correlation between technical complexity and bias
be seen in Figure 4.6a. The mean proportion of business interests in consultations organized by
regulatory DGs is slightly below 0.8. Figure 4.6b shows that the same is the case when using
the alternative, robustness measure of DG type. However, the lowess line turns upward when
the proportion of distributive consultations is 1. This indicates that consultations organized by
distributive DGs are fairly dominated by business interests as well.
H2b expects that consultations organized by distributive DGs are biased towards civil soci-
ety interests. This gets some support, as can be seen in Figure 4.7a. The mean proportion of
civil society group participants is higher for consultations organized by distributive DGs com-
pared to regulatory ones. It is not especially high overall, however. As Figure 4.7b shows, this
also holds for the robustness DG type measure. Instead, as Figure 4.6b shows, they are fairly
biased towards business interests.
Power
The results of the bivariate analyses indicate that most of the new variables only slightly affect
bias. Small effects are, however, unlikely to be detected in the expanded model because of a low
power level. This increases the chances of keeping a false null hypothesis, and concluding that a
variable does not affect bias when it does. To take this possibility into account, sparser models,
including fewer variables, are also used when running regressions in the ensuing chapter. This
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Figure 4.6: Bivariate correlation between DG type and the proportion of business and occupational groups
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Figure 4.7: Bivariate correlation between DG type and the proportion of civil society groups
increases the degrees of freedom and thus the power to detect small effects.
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4.3 Statistical models
The statistical models are considered in this section. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 454) run
an OLS and a fractional logit regression. The properties that make these models suitable here
as well are discussed. Furthermore, a multilevel linear model is used to take the hierarchical
nature of the data into account.
4.3.1 OLS regression
An OLS regression is run when bias is measured as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, following
Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, p. 454). The values of this measure range from around 0.18 to
1. Even though the OLS predictions may lie outside of this bounded range, Rasmussen &
Carroll (2014, p. 454) argue that it does not bias the results because of the measure’s normal
distribution3. For the expanded sample, the mentioned square root transformation of the HHI
corrects the slightly skewed distribution to the largest extent possible. This approximately
normally distributed measure is therefore the one used.
Other OLS requirements are also fulfilled. First, the residuals are normally distributed,
as Figure 4.8a shows. Second, Figure 4.8b shows that the errors have a constant variance,
fulfilling the homoskedasticity requirement (Long, 1997, p. 13). The residuals are spread out
evenly. Third, the residuals are not correlated, as evident by the Durbin-Watson statistic value
of 1.97. A value close to 2 indicates non-correlation. Lastly, most of the independent variables
do not correlate to a large degree. All the generalized variance inflation factor (GVIF)-values
are below 5, indicating that they are linearly independent (Long, 1997, p. 12). This does not
hold for salience, and the interaction term between salience and technical complexity, however.
Their GVIF-values are 12.87 and 16.02, respectively. That salience is correlated with itself via
the interaction term is not surprising – it is entered into the model twice. The correlation can
result in standard errors that are biased upward, which might yield non-significant results. This
does not justify omitting the interaction term, however (Brambor et al., 2006, p. 70).
One requirement is not fulfilled. The consultations are clustered according to the DGs. The
3A tobit model takes the censoring and slight concentration of observations at the upper limit of the dependent
variable into account (Tobin, 1958, pp. 24-25), and is run to see if the results are similar to that of the OLS
regression. This is found to be the case.
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(b) Homoskedasticity
Figure 4.8: OLS requirements
intraclass correlation coefficient for the square root transformed HHI measure is 0.26. 26% of
the variance in bias can thus be attributed to the DGs (Bliese, 2013, pp. 53, 71). This indicates
that the consultations organized by the same DG correlate and are dependent4. This violates
the assumption that errors are independently and identically distributed (Primo et al., 2007,
pp. 447-448). Ignoring the clustering can lead to standard errors that are biased downward
(Moulton, 1990, p. 334). Rasmussen et al. (2014, pp. 259-260) face the same issue in their
analysis of the European Commission’s online consultations. Their solution is to cluster the
standard errors according to policy areas. However, King & Roberts (2014, pp. 1-3, 6-7) point
out that this is not a sound strategy. Clustered standard errors should be used as a diagnostic
tool rather than a fix. A significant difference between clustered and classical standard errors
indicates that the model is misspecified – which usually also affects and biases the estimates.
4.3.2 Multilevel linear model
Instead, a multilevel linear regression is run to take the hierarchical structure of the data into
account. One issue is that the sample is fairly small, with 308 consultations and 25 DGs. The
average group mean reliability, which indicates whether the DG means can be reliably differ-
entiated from each other, is 0.6. It should ideally be above 0.7 (Bliese, 2013, pp. 52-54). To im-
prove the model performance, DGs that have organized a high number of consultations are split
4This dependence is also present in the initial sample – the ICC is 0.28.
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into several policy area categories. Those that have organized few consultations are grouped
together where possible. Details can be found in the codebook. This results in 30 DG/policy
area units5, and increases the average group mean reliability to 0.77. Some individual level two
units still fall below 0.7, however, indicating that the conditions to run a multilevel model are
still not optimal. The results are nonetheless presented and compared to the OLS outcomes in
Chapter 5.
4.3.3 Fractional regression
The remaining dependent variable measures are the proportion of business, occupational and
civil society group participants. These are bounded by 0 and 1. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014,
p. 454) use a fractional regression model for their proportion measure, which is also done
for the new ones added in this thesis. Fractional regression models are meant to be used for
proportional dependent variable measures, and thus give predictions that lie inside of the 0
to 1 interval. Furthermore, as Figure 4.2 shows, the measures are not normally distributed.
A large number of observations are gathered at the boundaries. This further underlines the
appropriateness of using fractional regression models (Ramalho et al., 2011, pp. 19-20).
The consultations are also clustered according to the DGs here. The ICC is 0.59 for the
proportion of business and occupational groups combined – 0.53 and 0.18, respectively, when
separated – and 0.18 for the proportion of civil society groups. A fair amount of the variation in
the direction of the bias can therefore be ascribed to the DGs and policy areas the consultations
are nested within. However, the sample is too limited to run a multilevel model – they do not
compute. Using sparser models yield random intercepts estimated to be 0, and is therefore not
a relevant alternative. To get an indication of whether the results of the fractional regressions
hold when taking the hierarchical structure into consideration, multilevel linear regressions
are run. The proportion measures are arcsine square root transformed – a common approach
when transforming proportions (Fox & Weisberg, 2011, p. 133) – to make them more normally
distributed.
5The ICC between the dependent variable measure and the DG/policy area variable is 0.33.
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4.4 Summary
This chapter gave a first look at the data, first by presenting descriptive statistics. Comparing
the distribution of interests in the consultations to that of the interest group population further-
more showed that the consultations are biased compared to this benchmark as well. Second, the
bivariate analyses showed that salience (H1) and activity (H3) are not supported. The format of
the consultations (H4) behaves as expected, but the correlation is weak. Technical complexity
has a relatively strong effect on bias, and is in the expected direction, lending support to H5.
The same is the case for H2a – consultations organized by regulatory DGs are generally biased
towards business interests. The bivariate analysis also lends slight support to H2b. The bias
towards civil society interests in consultations organized by distributive DGs is generally not
especially high, however. These results give an indication of the hypotheses that are likely to
be supported by the regression results. The non-supported ones are unlikely to garner support
when the other variables are included in the model as well. Furthermore, most of the correla-
tions were weak. The power to detect small effects in a regression analysis is low when using
the expanded model. To take this into account, sparser models are also used in the ensuing
chapter. An OLS and multilevel linear regression are run when bias is measured as the HHI.
When the direction of the bias is examined, fractional regression models are run.
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5 Regression analyses
The results of the OLS, multilevel linear and fractional regression analyses are presented and
discussed in this chapter. First, whether the hypotheses concerning the general degree of bias
are supported by the OLS results is examined. The multilevel results are then considered. Both
H5, concerning technical complexity, and Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expec-
tations are supported. H4, concerning the format, is supported when a sparser model, including
the new variables only, is used. H1 and H3, concerning salience and activity respectively, are
not supported.
Second, the direction of the bias is considered. Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 453-456)
examine whether their variables affect the bias towards business interests. Whether the new
variables, expected to affect the general degree of bias, also affect the bias towards business is
examined. Improving the somewhat misspecified fractional logit model, results in support to
three of the initial variables. None of the new variables, with the slight exception of technical
complexity, are found to affect the bias towards business interests. This indicates that there
might be some differences between what explains the general degree of bias and bias towards
business interests. Third, the hypotheses concerning the direction of the bias specifically are
examined. Of these, H2a is supported. Consultations organized by regulatory DGs are gener-
ally biased towards business interests. H2b and H6 are not supported. Lastly, the main results
are summarized.
5.1 The general degree of bias
In this section, the general degree of bias is examined. The results of the OLS regression1, using
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as the dependent variable, are discussed. The new hypotheses
1Running a tobit regression leads to the same conclusions as those based on the OLS results.
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are first considered, before briefly examining the initial, secondary expectations and the control
variables. One of the control variables is the openness of the consultations. As explained in
Chapter 3, what explains bias in open, selective and closed consultations might differ. The
results of running separate regressions for each category are also discussed. The missing data
is then addressed briefly, before considering the model fit. Lastly, the results of the multilevel
linear regression are discussed. The same hypotheses are found to be supported here as with
the OLS results.
5.1.1 OLS regression
Table 5.1 shows the OLS results. The first model is a replication of Rasmussen & Carroll
(2014, p. 455), the second is the results for the initial model using the expanded sample and
the third is the results for the expanded model2. To illustrate the effects, Figure 5.1 shows the
simulated expected value of the HHI for the expanded model as each measure changes from
its minimum to maximum value. The other measures are held at their mean or median values.
95% confidence intervals are displayed.
Main hypotheses
Of the new hypotheses concerning the general degree of bias, H5 is supported. Technically
complex consultations are generally more biased than less complex ones. As Table 5.1 and
Figure 5.1 show, when going from less complex consultations to complex ones, bias generally
increases. The effect is relatively strong. The HHI value for less complex consultations is
expected to be around 0.48 on the original scale, which increases to 0.55 for complex ones.
The estimate is furthermore statistically significant. Comparing the distribution of interests in
technically complex consultations to that of the population furthermore indicates that they are
biased in this respect as well. The distribution of interests in less complex consultations is more
similar to that of the population. These results can be found in the appendix.
None of the remaining new hypotheses concerning the general degree of bias are supported.
As Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 shows, the salience (H1) estimate is nearly 0. It is furthermore not
statistically significant, and thus not supported. The same is the case for H4, concerning the
2Year has been omitted to save space and can be found in the appendix. This is also the case for the subsequent
statistical results.
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Table 5.1: OLS results for the initial model (1), initial model and expanded sample (2) and expanded model (3)
Bias (HHI) Transformed HHI
(1) (2) (3)
Policy type
Expenditure policy −0.108∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗
(0.037) (0.028) (0.019)
Administrative policy −0.017 −0.012 −0.001
(0.040) (0.031) (0.021)
Cost structure
Concentrated costs 0.089∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.017)
Actor bias 0.576∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.094) (0.063)
Density −0.132∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.021) (0.015)
Duration −0.002 −0.004∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Salience −0.0002
(0.002)
DG type −0.088∗∗∗
(0.028)
Number of staff 0.00005
(0.00003)
Format
Non-standardized 0.025
(0.019)
Technical complexity 0.057∗∗
(0.026)
Tech. compl. × sal. 0.0004
(0.002)
Openness
Selective 0.029∗
(0.017)
Closed 0.017
(0.027)
N 210 308 302
R2 0.328 0.296 0.369
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.258 0.315
Residual Std. Error 0.181 (df = 194) 0.176 (df = 291) 0.113 (df = 277)
F Statistic 6.323∗∗∗ (df = 15; 194) 7.653∗∗∗ (df = 16; 291) 6.757∗∗∗ (df = 24; 277)
Note: The baseline categories are regulatory policy, diffuse costs, regulatory DGs, standardized and
semi-standardized consultations, less complex consultations, and open consultations.
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Figure 5.1: Simulated expected values of the square root transformed Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 95% confi-
dence intervals
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format of the consultations. The estimate is in the expected direction – bias increases by around
0.03 units on the original HHI scale when going from semi-standardized and standardized
consultations to non-standardized ones. The effect is neither strong nor significant, however.
H4 is thus not supported.
Unlike the salience and format estimates, the activity estimate is not in the expected direc-
tion. H3 is the expectation that consultations in areas where the EU is less active are more
biased than ones in areas with a higher level of activity. As Table 5.1 shows, the opposite is
estimated to be the case. Consultations organized by more active DGs are associated with a
higher degree of bias. The estimate is not significant, however. These results are mimicked
when using the robustness measure – legislative activity. The correlation is again positive and
non-significant3. H3 is overall not supported, as the bivariate analysis also indicated.
One thing these three non-supported hypotheses have in common is that the estimated ef-
fects are fairly small, as the bivariate analyses showed as well. The power to detect small effects
is low. They are only likely to be detected around 20% of the time given the sample size and
degrees of freedom. The chances of keeping a false null hypothesis – concluding that there
is no correlation when there is – in the cases of H1, H3 and H4 are therefore high. To get an
indication of whether this is the case, an OLS regression is run for a model including only the
new variables. Including fewer variables increases the degrees of freedom, which improves the
power to detect small effects to 0.35. Both the DG staff and format estimates are small, but
significant in this model. The format estimate is furthermore in the expected direction, lending
support to H4. H3 is again not supported – the activity estimate is not in the expected direction.
The salience estimate is not significant. Running an OLS regression including only salience,
results in a significant, positive estimate. This is the opposite of the expected effect. Overall,
the sparser model lends some support to H4. The conclusion that H1 and H3 are not supported
can furthermore be drawn with slightly more certainty.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s expectations
All of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations, related to the policy type, cost
structure, actor bias and interest group density, are supported. As Table 5.1 shows, the effects
3Transforming the activity measures to take the potential non-linearity of the effects into account, results in the
same conclusions. This also holds for the subsequent statistical results.
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are slightly weaker when using the expanded sample. The same is the case when including the
new independent variables. Figure 5.1 shows that the policy type and especially cost structure
of a consultation do not affect the degree of bias to a large extent. A low degree of actor bias
or a high number of interest group density, on the other hand, lead to a fairly steep decline in
bias. That the estimates are statistically significant and fairly certain is indicated by the slim
confidence intervals.
As discussed in Chapter 2, however, actor bias and interest group density are closely re-
lated to the dependent variable. They all concern the participants of the consultations, and
actor bias furthermore somewhat measures the same concept as the dependent variable. These
factors make the expectations less interesting than the others. They are therefore removed from
the expanded model before running the regression anew. The results can be found in the ap-
pendix. The conclusions are overall the same – H5 and Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 447)
expectations concerning the policy type and cost structure of the proposals are supported. Two
additional estimates are moreover also significant – DG staff (H3) and format (H4). This lends
further support to the conclusion that activity does not have the expected effect on bias, whereas
format does.
Control variables
The effects of the control variables from the initial model – year and the duration of the con-
sultation period – are not found to systematically affect bias. Furthermore, consultations are
estimated to become more biased over time. This is the opposite of the expected effect. The
duration estimate is in the expected direction, as Table 5.1 shows. As for the new control vari-
able, openness, Table 5.1 shows that consultations with target groups are more biased than open
ones. This result is statistically significant. Closed consultations are also estimated to be more
biased, but not significantly. This control variable therefore behaves somewhat as predicted.
However, what affects bias could differ between open, selective and closed consultations.
The consultations are therefore divided in three according to their openness, and separate OLS
regressions are run for each type. The results can be found in the appendix. For the open
consultations, the results of the OLS regression are very similar to the results reported above.
The conclusions still hold.
Only 93 and 23 consultations are coded as selective and closed, respectively. These sample
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sizes limit the power to detect both small and medium-sized effects. The results for selective
consultations differ from the results for open ones. Technical complexity is no longer signifi-
cant, but still in the expected direction. Interestingly, activity has a significant, positive effect on
bias in selective consultations. This is the opposite of the hypothesized relationship. Another
notable difference is the small, non-significant actor bias estimate. Rasmussen & Carroll’s
(2014, p. 448) third expectation is therefore not supported for selective consultations. None of
the results for the closed consultations are statistically significant, which is not surprising with
only 23 observations. Some are also in the opposite of the expected direction. Overall, these
results indicate that there may be differences between what affects bias in open, selective and
closed consultations. To be able to conclude anything with more certainty, however, a larger
number of observations is needed.
Missing data
Six consultations are deleted when running the OLS regression for the expanded model, due to
missing format and openness values. The missingness is a result of defunct websites, making
the information necessary to classify these consultations unavailable. Using the multiple impu-
tation method of King et al. (2001), with five imputed datasets, leads to the same conclusions
as those described above. The same hypotheses are supported with and without imputing the
missing data. The same is the case when using the alternative, robustness measures.
Model fit
Concerning the model fit, the statistics reported in Table 5.1 indicate that all three models do
reasonably well. The F statistic is above 1 and statistically significant for all three models,
implying that there is a relationship between the measures and bias (James et al., 2013, p. 76).
Moreover, the classical and robust standard errors (not reported) are more or less the same,
which indicates that the models are well-specified (King & Roberts, 2014, pp. 1-3). Some of
the statistics furthermore imply that the expanded model does better than the initial one. The
residual standard error is lower, indicating a better fit. Bias is expected to deviate less from the
true regression line (James et al., 2013, pp. 68-69). The expanded model also explains more of
the variance in bias than the initial model, as shown by the higher R2 and adjusted R2 values.
Since all relevant consultations have been included in the sample, the estimated standard
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errors are less informative (Ward et al., 2010, p. 372). The out-of-sample prediction perfor-
mance of the models is therefore also considered. The results are described in the appendix.
Comparing the out-of-sample performance of the initial and expanded model indicates that the
latter is slightly better at predicting new samples. Activity and salience are found to worsen
the performance, however. A sparser model, excluding these, gives the best prediction rates.
Overall, this indicates that more of the variance is explained by the expanded model – and even
more without activity and salience – compared to the initial one on its own.
Even though the robust and classical standard errors are found to be more or less the same,
this is not the case when the standard errors are clustered according to the DGs. These deviate
more from the classical ones, which can bias the estimates. As shown in Chapter 4, most of the
OLS requirements are fulfilled4. However, the assumption that errors are independently and
identically distributed is violated by the multilevel structure of the data. That the consultations
are clustered according to the DGs is not taken into account by an OLS model.
5.1.2 Multilevel linear model
A multilevel model takes the hierarchical structure of the data into account. Table 5.2 shows the
results of the multilevel linear regression for Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) initial
model using the initial and expanded sample, as well as the results for the expanded model. The
model statistics show that the initial, sparser model fits better than the expanded one. The main
conclusions discussed above still hold, however5. H5, concerning technical complexity, is again
supported but only significant at the 10%-level. The standard error is larger, reflecting that the
technical complexity measure concerns the policy areas, rather than the proposals directly. The
effect is furthermore estimated to be slightly stronger.
The estimates related to H1, H3 and H4 are again not significant. The format (H4) estimate
is in the expected direction, however. Running a regression for a model including just the
new independent variables furthermore indicates that it is significant. H4 therefore receives
some support. This is not the case for H1 (salience) and H3 (activity). The salience estimate
is nearly nonexistent and non-significant, as Table 5.2 shows. Furthermore, an increase in
4One exception is the high correlation between salience and the interaction term. Removing the interaction
term still results in diverging classical and clustered standard errors.
5This is also the case when imputing the missing values.
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Table 5.2: Multilevel linear results for the initial model (1), initial model and expanded sample (2) and expanded
model (3)
HHI Transformed HHI
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed effects
Expenditure policy −0.077∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗
(0.039) (0.029) (0.020)
Administrative policy 0.012 0.0004 0.003
(0.040) (0.031) (0.021)
Concentrated costs 0.067∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.017)
Actor bias 0.515∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.094) (0.062)
Density −0.128∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.021) (0.015)
Duration 0.0001 −0.002 −0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Salience 0.0002
(0.002)
DG type −0.084∗∗
(0.034)
Number of staff 0.00004
(0.00004)
Non-standardized 0.013
(0.020)
Technical complexity 0.070∗
(0.036)
Tech. compl. × sal. −0.00001
(0.002)
Selective 0.029∗
(0.017)
Closed 0.012
(0.027)
Random effect
Intercept variance 0.006 0.006 0.002
(0.077) (0.075) (0.044)
Consultation level N 210 308 302
Policy area level N 29 30 30
Log Likelihood 34.080 67.902 157.482
AIC −32.159 −97.805 −260.965
BIC 28.089 −26.933 −160.783
Note: Standard deviation in the parentheses for the random intercepts.
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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salience is here expected to lead to a slight increase in bias. This is the opposite of the expected
effect. The activity estimate related to H3 is also small, not in the expected direction and non-
significant. This is also the case when using the alternative measure, legislative activity. These
results mimic those of the OLS regression.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations, concerning policy type, cost
structure, actor bias and interest group density, are all supported by the multilevel results as
well. The estimates and standard errors are more or less the same as the ones in the OLS
model. Overall, the conclusions from the OLS regression are upheld when running a multilevel
linear regression.
5.2 The direction of the bias
In this section, what affects the direction of the bias is examined. Four different proportion
measures are used to gauge this, and fractional regressions are run. Rasmussen & Carroll
(2014, pp. 447-448, 453) do not have any specific expectations regarding the direction of the
bias. They nevertheless examine whether any of their variables affect the proportion of business
interests represented in the consultations, since bias is often posited as a bias towards business.
Whether any of the new variables, expected to affect the general degree of bias, also affect the
bias towards business is therefore examined here as well. The fractional logit model Rasmussen
& Carroll (2014, p. 454) use is found to be slightly misspecified, and an improved model
is therefore also used. Subsequently, the two new hypotheses that specifically concern the
direction of the bias are examined.
5.2.1 Bias towards business interests
Table 5.3 shows the results of the replication of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 456) initial
model, the results for the initial model using the expanded sample, as well as the results for
the expanded model. The dependent variable measure here is the proportion of business and
occupational group participants.
To better be able to interpret the results, Table 5.4 shows the odds ratios. The ones labeled
RC are the odds ratios in the initial model, whereas the rest are for the expanded model. Fur-
thermore, a visualization of the results can be seen in Figure 5.2. This shows the simulated
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Table 5.3: Fractional logit results for the initial model (1), initial model and expanded sample (2) and expanded
model (3)
Proportion of bus. and occ.
group participants
(1) (2) (3)
Expenditure policy −0.774∗ −0.966∗∗∗ −0.549
(0.458) (0.343) (0.390)
Administrative policy −0.500 −0.342 −0.038
(0.501) (0.395) (0.430)
Concentrated costs 0.443 0.429 0.389
(0.412) (0.317) (0.355)
Actor bias 3.294∗ 1.091 1.100
(1.951) (1.355) (1.410)
Density −0.236 −0.026 −0.114
(0.624) (0.261) (0.312)
Duration −0.002 −0.011 0.017
(0.029) (0.025) (0.029)
Salience −0.008
(0.031)
DG type −1.197∗∗
(0.526)
Number of staff −0.0001
(0.001)
Non-standardized 0.244
(0.393)
Technical complexity 0.147
(0.506)
Tech. compl. × sal. 0.033
(0.033)
Selective 0.134
(0.376)
Closed 0.065
(0.586)
N 210 308 302
Log Likelihood −77.513 −126.887 −106.058
AIC 187.027 287.774 262.116
BIC 240.581 351.185 354.877
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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expected proportion of business and occupational group participants as each independent vari-
able measure in turn changes from its minimum to maximum value, holding the other variables
at their mean or median values. 95% confidence intervals are displayed.
Table 5.4: Odds ratios in the initial and expanded model
Odds ratio Std. Err. z P>|z|
Expenditure policy (RC) 0.461 0.211 -1.691 0.091
Expenditure policy 0.577 0.225 -1.407 0.159
Administrative policy (RC) 0.607 0.304 -0.997 0.319
Administrative policy 0.963 0.414 -0.089 0.929
Concentrated costs (RC) 1.557 0.641 1.076 0.282
Concentrated costs 1.476 0.523 1.098 0.272
Actor bias (RC) 26.958 52.609 1.688 0.091
Actor bias 3.005 4.237 0.780 0.435
Density (RC) 0.790 0.493 -0.379 0.705
Density 0.892 0.279 -0.365 0.715
Duration (RC) 0.998 0.029 -0.055 0.956
Duration 1.017 0.029 0.575 0.565
Salience 0.992 0.031 -0.247 0.805
DG type 0.302 0.159 -2.273 0.023
Number of staff 1.000 0.001 -0.090 0.928
Non-standardized 1.276 0.501 0.621 0.535
Technical complexity 1.158 0.586 0.290 0.772
Tech. compl. × sal. 1.033 0.034 0.998 0.318
Selective 1.143 0.429 0.356 0.722
Closed 1.067 0.625 0.111 0.912
Note: RC indicates the odds ratios in the initial model.
New variables
As Table 5.3 shows, none of the new variables that are found to affect the general degree of bias
systematically affect the bias towards business interests. Technical complexity is, for instance,
consistently found to affect the general degree of bias. Here, the estimate is in the expected
direction – the proportion of business participants increases by around 54% when going from
less complex to complex consultations – but it is not significant. The increase is slight and
uncertain, as Figure 5.2 illustrates. Technical complexity is thus not found to affect the bias
towards business interests. The same is the case for salience, activity and format. Running a
fractional logit regression for the new variables only, confirms these results.
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Figure 5.2: Simulated expected values of the proportion of business and occupational group participants, 95%
confidence intervals
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Rasmussen & Carroll’s variables
The estimates related to Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations are all in the
predicted directions, but are not statistically significant in the expanded model. The actor bias
estimate is furthermore quasi-separated. This can be seen by the large odds ratios in Table
5.4. Quasi-separation occurs when, for instance, a high degree of actor bias is consistently
associated with a high proportion of business and occupational group participants. This results
in an independent variable, actor bias, that separates the dependent variable nearly perfectly
(UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, n.d.). Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 455-456) do not
comment on the quasi-separation issue, but treat it as a standard estimate. That the estimate is
trustworthy when it is quasi-separated is doubtful.
The quasi-separation issue may stem from the fact that the measure concerns the same
concept as the dependent variable. Both measure bias, albeit different aspects. That actor
bias is able to predict the proportion of business and occupational group participants to a large
degree is therefore not very surprising. Removing the variable from the analysis changes the
strength of some of the estimates, but not the overall conclusions. The same is the case when
interest group density, which is closely related to the dependent variable as well, is removed.
The results can be found in the appendix.
Improving the model
To summarize, none of the variables that affect the general degree of bias is found to affect
the bias towards business interests in the fractional logit model6. This stands in contrast to the
conclusions of Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 454, 456), who find that all but their interest
group density variable affect it. One reason for this discrepancy is that they use robust, rather
than classical, standard errors. There is a fairly large difference between the two kinds of stan-
dard errors in these models (not reported). In most cases the robust standard errors are at least
half the size of the classical ones. Even though various tests7 indicate that the functional form
is appropriate, differences between classical and robust standard errors indicate that models
are misspecified. This can bias the estimates. Misspecified models are furthermore a problem
robust standard errors do not fix (King & Roberts, 2014, pp. 1-3, 6-7).
6This also holds when imputing the missing data.
7The RESET- and goodness-of-functional-form tests proposed by Ramalho et al. (2011, pp. 28, 30-33).
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To improve the expanded model, the proportion measure is arcsine square root transformed
– a common approach when transforming proportions (Fox & Weisberg, 2011, p. 133). This
results in a fairly normally distributed measure. Subsequently, an OLS and a multilevel linear
regression are run. The discrepancy between the classical and robust standard errors is lower,
indicating a better fit. Several of the estimates are statistically significant. This is the case
for three of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 453) variables – actor bias, cost structure and
policy type. Furthermore, technical complexity is statistically significant at the 10%-level in
the multilevel model – indicating that generally, a higher proportion of business interests are
represented in technically complex consultations. In sum, these more trustworthy results indi-
cate that some of the variables expected to affect the general degree of bias also affect the bias
towards business interests. There also seems to be some differences, however. This could be a
result of the low power to detect small effects8. A larger sample is therefore needed to be able
to conclude with more certainty that there are differences.
5.2.2 The direction of the bias
Whether the two new hypotheses concerning the direction of the bias are supported is consid-
ered in this section. First, H2 related to the type of DG organizing a consultation is examined.
Second, the interaction effect between technical complexity and salience – H6 – is explored.
DG type
H2 is split in two sub-hypotheses. The first part, H2a, states that consultations organized by
DGs that mainly deal with regulatory matters are expected to be biased towards business inter-
ests. When business interests are measured as the proportion of both business and occupational
group participants9, H2a is supported. As Figure 5.2 shows, consultations organized by regula-
tory DGs are generally expected to be highly biased towards business interests. The expected
proportion lies slightly below 0.8. Furthermore, the slim confidence intervals indicate that this
result is fairly certain. Using the alternative, robustness DG type measure – the proportion of
8The results of running a sparser model including the new variables only – thus increasing the power – do not
differ much from the results for the expanded model. Format is, however, found to significantly affect the bias
towards business (estimate 0.126, standard error 0.040) in the OLS results, but not the multilevel ones.
9The conclusions also hold when business interests are measured as the proportion of trade and other business
groups only, excluding occupational groups.
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distributive consultations each DG has organized – yields similar results, with the expected
proportion of business interests lying around 0.8. An increase in the proportion of distributive
consultations leads to a 16%10 decrease in the proportion of business participants, which is sig-
nificant with a p-value of 0.035. Consultations organized by regulatory DGs are thus found to
generally be biased towards business interests, as expected.
These results also hold when taking the missing data into account by using the imputed
datasets. Furthermore, comparing the distribution of interests in consultations organized by
regulatory DGs to that of the interest group population in the EU, reveals that business interests
are overrepresented in this respect as well. This comparison can be found in the appendix.
The second part of this hypothesis, H2b, is the expectation that consultations organized by
distributive DGs are biased towards civil society interests. As can be seen in Table 5.4, the DG
type odds ratio is 0.302. When going from consultations organized by regulatory DGs to those
organized by distributive ones, the proportion of business interests generally decreases by 23%.
Compared to regulatory DGs, consultations organized by distributive DGs are not expected to
be as biased towards business interests. However, as Figure 5.2 shows, the expected proportion
of business participants is still above 0.5 – although this is somewhat uncertain, as the wide
confidence intervals display. Based on this result, which mimics that of the bivariate analysis,
it is already clear that consultations organized by distributive DGs are not biased towards civil
society interests to a large degree.
Using the proportion of civil society group participants as the dependent variable measure,
Figure 5.3 shows the simulated expected value of this proportion when going from consulta-
tions organized by regulatory to distributive DGs. The increase in the proportion of civil society
interests is small – around 59% with an odds ratio of 1.423. This is furthermore not statisti-
cally significant, as the wide confidence intervals show. The results are similar when using
the alternative DG type measure11. Comparing the distribution in these consultations to that
of the interest group population shows that identity groups are overrepresented, however. This
lends some support to the hypothesis. Public interests, on the other hand, are slightly under-
represented. Overall, H2b is therefore not supported. The consultations are instead found to
be characterized by a fairly high proportion of business interests, albeit less so than for those
10The odds ratio is 0.188.
11An increase in the proportion of distributive proposals leads to a 63% increase in the proportion of civil society
group participants (odds ratio 1.706). The increase is not significant.
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Figure 5.3: Simulated expected values of the proportion of civil society group participants, 95% confidence inter-
vals
organized by regulatory DGs.
These results also hold when transforming the dependent variable measures to run multi-
level linear regressions. Although this is not ideal, it is the only alternative that computes and
thus gives an indication of whether the results would hold when the hierarchical structure of
the data is taken into account.
Interaction between technical complexity and salience
H6 also concerns the direction of the bias. Different combinations of technical complexity
and salience are expected to lead to a bias towards different types of interests. H6 consists of
three sub-hypotheses, which are examined in turn here. A fractional logit regression is run for
each model, with the exception of the proportion of occupational group participants where a
fractional cauchit regression is run12. The conclusions discussed below also hold when running
multilevel linear regressions, with arcsine square root transformed proportion measures.
12The distribution of the proportion of occupational group participants is highly skewed. The Cauchy distribu-
tion is more robust to outliers compared to, for instance, the logistic distribution (Ramalho et al., 2011, p. 23). A
fractional cauchit regression is therefore found to be a better fit in this case.
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Figure 5.4: The effect of salience on the proportion of occupational group participants depending on technical
complexity, predicted probabilities, 95% confidence intervals
H6a concerns bias towards occupational interests. Figure 5.4 shows the simulated predicted
probabilities of the proportion of occupational group participants. Salience varies from its min-
imum to maximum value, whereas technical complexity and non-complexity are held constant.
95% confidence intervals are displayed. First, technically complex and less salient consulta-
tions are expected to be biased towards occupational interests. As can be seen, the predicted
proportion is nearly nonexistent for consultations that fulfill these criteria. Second, technically
complex and salient consultations are also expected to be biased towards occupational interests.
The predicted proportion is slightly higher compared to less salient consultations, but is still
low. Furthermore, Figure 5.4a shows that occupational groups are likelier to participate in less
complex consultations that are both salient and less salient, than they are to participate in com-
plex ones. The confidence intervals are furthermore wide and overlapping, indicating that the
results are not significantly different from each other. Overall, H6a is therefore not supported.
H6b concerns bias towards business interests, here operationalized as trade and other busi-
ness group participants only. Figure 5.5 shows the predicted probabilities. First, technically
complex and less salient consultations are expected to be biased towards business interests. A
high proportion of business groups is predicted to participate in such consultations, as Figure
5.5b shows. However, the proportion increases as salience increases, which is unexpected. Sec-
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Figure 5.5: The effect of salience on the proportion of business group participants depending on technical com-
plexity, predicted probabilities, 95% confidence intervals
ond, less complex and less salient consultations are also expected to be biased towards business
interests. The predicted proportion of business groups is fairly high for less complex and less
salient consultations – and it decreases as salience increases. However, the confidence intervals
display that the results are uncertain and not significantly different from each other. H6b is thus
not supported.
Lastly, H6c is the expectation that salient and less complex consultations are biased to-
wards citizen interests. Figure 5.6, which displays the predicted probabilities, shows that the
proportion of citizen group participants is predicted to be higher for less complex consultations
compared to complex ones. The proportion does not increase with salience in less complex
ones, however, but remains fairly stable with a very slight decrease instead13. The predicted
proportion is moreover not especially high. The results are uncertain, however, as the wide
confidence intervals show. They furthermore overlap, and are thus not significantly different
from each other. H6c is overall not supported.
To summarize, H6 and its sub-hypotheses are not supported. The business (H6b) results are
somewhat in the expected direction, which is not the case for H6a and H6c. The results are,
13Interestingly, the proportion of citizen groups decreases as salience increases for technically complex consul-
tations. This is contrary to the expectation that citizen groups will participate when issues are important to a large
part of the public.
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Figure 5.6: The effect of salience on the proportion of citizen group participants depending on technical complex-
ity, predicted probabilities, 95% confidence intervals
however, not significant. One potential reason for this is that the power to detect small effects
is low. To get an indication of whether this might be the case, sparser models including only
salience, technical complexity and the interaction term are used. This increases the degrees of
freedom and thus the power to detect small effects. Figures displaying the results can be found
in the appendix.
The results of these regressions are more certain. The confidence intervals overlap to a
lesser degree. First, H6a is still not supported. Occupational groups are predicted to participate
more in less complex – rather than complex – consultations that are either salient or less so.
Second, the results related to H6b are similar to the ones for the complete model. As expected,
the proportion of business interests is predicted to decrease as salience increases in less complex
consultations. However, the proportion is once again predicted to increase as salience increases
in complex consultations. One part of H6b is therefore supported, whereas the other is not.
Lastly, the results for H6c are slightly different to the ones reported above. They are now in the
expected direction. The predicted proportion of citizen groups increases as salience increases
in less complex consultations. The proportion is furthermore again predicted to be higher in
less complex consultations compared to complex ones. These results are, however, still fairly
uncertain. Overall, this lends some support to H6b. The results related to H6c are in the
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expected direction, but uncertain. H6a is not supported.
5.3 Summary
A summary of the results discussed in this chapter follows. First, the hypotheses concerning
the general degree of bias were examined based on the results of an OLS and a multilevel linear
regression. Technically complex consultations were found to generally be more biased than less
complex ones, lending support to H5. It furthermore constituted one of the stronger effects.
H1, H3 and H4 were not supported in the expanded model. None of the related estimates
were significant. They were, however, significant when using sparser models where the power
to detect small effects was higher. Neither salience (H1) nor activity (H3) had the expected
effect on bias in these cases. That they are not supported can therefore be concluded with more
certainty. The format of a consultation (H4), on the other hand, behaved as expected. Going
from more standardized to non-standardized consultations generally leads to a slight increase in
bias. It might therefore affect bias in reality, but go undetected in the expanded model because
of the low power level. To be able to conclude more decisively that it does not systematically
affect bias when the initial variables are included in the model as well, would require more
observations. Lastly, all of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations were still
supported, although the estimates were weaker, when the expanded sample was used, as well
as after having included the new variables in the model. This indicates that their findings are
robust.
Second, whether the variables expected to affect the general degree of bias also affect the
bias towards business interests were examined, following Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 453-
456). Based on the results of a fractional logit regression, none were found to significantly
do so. This model was somewhat misspecified, however. This was taken into account. The
findings based on the results of the improved models are summarized in Table 5.5. Three of
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) variables – policy type, cost structure and actor bias
– were found to affect the bias towards business. Technical complexity also had a significant
effect on it, albeit only in the multilevel model. These findings indicate that there might be
some differences between what explains the general degree and the direction of the bias. To be
able to conclude this with more certainty, a larger sample is needed so that the power to detect
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small effects is higher.
Table 5.5: Findings regarding the bias towards business interests, based on the improved models
Variable Affects biastowards business
Does not affect bias
towards business
Salience X
Activity X
Format X
Technical
complexity
X
Policy type X
Cost struc-
ture
X
Actor bias X
Interest group
density
X
Third, the hypotheses concerning the direction of the bias were examined based on the
results of fractional logit and cauchit regressions. H2a was supported. Consultations organized
by regulatory DGs were found to generally be biased towards business interests. H2b was not
supported. Consultations organized by distributive DGs were not found to generally be biased
towards civil society groups. H6 was generally not supported either. Using the expanded model
led to uncertain results, whereas using a sparser model led to more certain ones. H6a expects
technically complex and salient consultations, as well as complex and less salient ones, to be
biased towards occupational interests. Instead, the findings indicated that a higher proportion
was represented in less complex and either salient or less salient consultations. H6b got some
support. Less complex and less salient consultations were found to generally be more biased
towards business interests than less complex and salient ones. However, complex and salient
consultations were found to generally be more biased towards business interests than complex
and less salient ones. This part was therefore not supported. Lastly, H6c was not supported.
The results of the sparser model indicated that complex and less salient consultations were
slightly more biased towards citizen interests, but the results were uncertain.
Other findings in this chapter included that the initial control variables – year and duration
– still did not have a significant effect on the general degree of bias. Openness was found to
somewhat affect it, with selective consultations generally being slightly more biased than open
ones. The regressions that were run for open, selective and closed consultations separately
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moreover indicated that there might be differences between them when it comes to relevant
explanatory factors. However, more observations would be needed to conclude this with more
certainty. Lastly, two of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 447) initial variables – actor bias and
the number of interest group participants – were removed from the model to see whether the
results still held without them. This was done because they are closely related to the dependent
variable. The actor bias estimate is furthermore quasi-separated in the fractional logit model.
The main conclusions were found to still hold.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
In this chapter, the implications of the findings are looked at more in depth. First, theoretical
and normative aspects of the findings are discussed. What light the results sheds on previous
relevant findings is also considered. Second, how the participation patterns align with the
expectations of the pluralist, transactions and neo-pluralist perspectives presented in Chapter 1
is discussed. Lastly, the main conclusions of the thesis are summarized.
6.1 Implications of the findings
The larger theoretical and normative implications of the findings, and how they align with pre-
vious research, are discussed in this section. This is first done for the results related to the
general degree of bias. Given that the conclusions regarding the initial expectations are upheld
in this thesis, the implications are not discussed as this has been done previously by Rasmussen
& Carroll (2014, p. 457). Instead, how the findings align with the new, transactions based ex-
pectations proposed in this thesis regarding policy type and cost structure is discussed. Second,
the implications of the results related to the two new hypotheses concerning the direction of the
bias are discussed.
6.1.1 General degree of bias
Four of the new hypotheses concern the general degree of bias in online consultations, in addi-
tion to Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations. Table 6.1 gives an overview
of these, their theoretical foundations and whether they are supported.
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Table 6.1: The hypotheses concerning the general degree of bias, their theoretical foundations and whether they
are supported
Hypothesis and theory General degree of bias
H1: Consultations concerning less salient matters are more biased
than consultations concerning salient matters.
Theory: pluralism. All affected groups are assumed to participate.
Not supported.
H3: Consultations in areas where the EU is less active are more bi-
ased than consultations in areas where the EU is more active.
Theory: cost-benefit. The potential gains from contributing are as-
sumed to be lower in areas where the EU is less active.
Not supported.
H4: Non-standardized consultations are more biased than standard-
ized consultations.
Theory: cost-benefit. Participating in standardized consultations is
assumed to be more resource demanding.
Slightly supported.
H5: Consultations concerning technically complex matters are more
biased than consultations concerning less complex matters.
Theory: cost-benefit. Participating in technically complex consulta-
tions is assumed to be more resource demanding.
Supported.
Policy type (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014): Consultations concern-
ing regulatory policies are more biased than consultations concern-
ing distributive policies.
Theory: pluralism. All affected groups are assumed to participate.
Supported.
Cost structure (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014): Consultations with
concentrated costs are more biased than consultations with diffuse
costs.
Theory: pluralism. All affected groups are assumed to participate.
Supported.
Actor bias (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014): A higher degree of actor
bias is associated with a higher degree of participation bias
Theory: pluralism. The idea that societal development leads to a
more diverse interest group population is applied to consultations.
When consultations are complex with respect to the types of actors
participating, they are also assumed to be complex when it comes
to the interests represented.
Supported.
Interest group density (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014): Consultati-
ons are more biased if the number of participating interest groups is
low.
Theory: pluralism. All affected interests are assumed to be represen-
ted based on their wish to countervail the views of other participating
groups.
Supported.
Technical complexity
As Table 6.1 shows, H5 is the only new hypothesis concerning the general degree of bias that
is fully supported. Consultations concerning technically complex matters are found to gen-
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erally be more biased than those concerning less complex matters. The theoretical reasoning
behind this hypothesis concerns the costs of contributing to a consultation. Contributing to
complex ones are assumed to be more resource demanding. This may result in a higher num-
ber of negative cost-benefit analyses, and subsequently more biased participation patterns in
complex consultations. If this is what causes the correlation, the finding indicates that a factor
based on a cost-benefit perspective also affects bias. Whether this is the actual causal chain
is not confirmed, however, since statistical correlations do not equal causality. An aspect that
nevertheless lends some support to it, is that technical complexity is determined before bias
in time. It is therefore probable that technical complexity, rather than bias, is the cause of the
correlation.
The two case studies described in Chapter 2 find that e-participation opportunities for the
public regarding GMO products are dominated by experts (Ferretti & Lener, 2008, pp. 507-508,
510-511, 521-522; Steffek & Ferretti, 2009, pp. 44, 47-49). The broader study conducted here
adds to this by finding that technically complex online consultations are biased in general. It
is not limited to a specific case. This general finding arguably also has normative implications.
If the Commission wants input from a wide range of interests, it is not sufficient to have the
consultations be formally open for everyone. If they deal with technically complex matters,
participation is still likely to be fairly biased. The interest group channel is thus not as good
a source to democratic, input legitimacy in complex consultations. If a DG dealing with tech-
nically complex issues wants to attract contributions from a broader range of interest groups,
taking specific action to do this can be necessary.
Furthermore, when continuing work on the proposal a consultation concerns, it may be
challenging for the Commission to map out and take the interests of those that did not partici-
pate into account. If the groups participating in complex consultations are able to influence the
proposals, less representative ones might therefore be the outcome. In the US, lobbying has
been found to be successful “when only one or a handful of organizations lobby on a narrow
technical issue of little concern to the public” (Lowery, 2007, p. 36). However, Klu¨ver (2011,
pp. 496-497) does not find that lobbying on technically complex issues in the EU systemati-
cally leads to an increase in lobby success. The estimate is in the expected direction, but it is
not significant. This could nevertheless imply that the participants in complex consultations
are likelier to influence the proposals in some cases, albeit not generally, compared to those
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participating in less complex ones.
Overall, the bias in consultations concerning technically complex matters might be some-
what normatively problematic. The interest group channel does not provide a representative
picture of the interests in society, and the outcomes may be less representative in the cases
were the participants are able to influence the proposals.
Salience, activity and format
Table 6.1 shows that, of the three remaining new hypotheses, H1 and H3 are not supported.
H4 is slightly supported – the format estimate is in the expected direction, and also found to
systematically affect bias when using a sparser model.
First, H1 concerns the salience of the consultations. The theoretical reasoning behind this
variable relates to the initial, pluralistic framework of Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 447-
448). All affected interests are assumed to participate. Salient matters are important to a large
part of the public, and are therefore assumed to affect a broader range of interests. Consultations
concerning such issues are therefore expected to be less biased than consultations concerning
less salient matters. Salience is only found to have a systematic effect on bias when using a
model where this is the only variable included. Here, a higher level of salience is associated
with a very slight increase in bias – the opposite of the expected effect. One reason for this could
be that the less affected – or those without selective incentives, in line with the transactions
perspective – do not contribute. A more in-depth analysis would be needed to be able to discern
the causal workings behind salience’s effect on participation bias, however.
Concerning previous results, Rasmussen et al. (2014, pp. 260-262) find that a high degree of
salience is correlated with a higher number of interest group participants in the Commission’s
online consultations. That salience only slightly affects the degree of bias, and not in the
expected direction, implies that there is a difference between what explains the number of
interest group participants in a consultation and its degree of bias.
Second, H3 is the expectation that consultations in areas where the EU is less active are
more biased than ones in areas with more activity. Interest groups have limited resources,
making it a potentially more rewarding strategy to focus on consultations in areas where the
EU is more active and assumed to have more competences. However, the findings indicate that
more activity is associated with more – not less – biased consultations. One reason for this
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could be that well-endowed groups might participate no matter the activity levels, which could
mitigate the effect of activity on bias. This does not explain why bias is estimated to increase
when activity increases, however. The positive correlation indicates that the theoretical account
behind H3 is not the whole story. Other forces is likely to be at work here, which this thesis does
not uncover. The finding furthermore highlights that what explains the number of interest group
participants is not necessarily the same as what explains participation bias. Both Rasmussen
et al. (2014, pp. 259-260) and Mahoney (2004, p. 460) find a positive correlation between EU
activity and interest group activity, whereas higher levels of activity potentially leads to more
biased consultations.
Lastly, H4 concerns the format of an online consultation and gets slight support here. The
theoretical reasoning behind this hypothesis relates to the costs associated with participating.
Consultations with a more standardized format are assumed to demand less resources than
non-standardized ones, opening up for more positive cost-benefit analyses. Since only one
consultation in the sample is standardized, the effect might have been stronger had it been pos-
sible to include more of them. That H4 gets slight support nevertheless implies that organizing
consultations that are more standardized is one way to increase the inclusiveness.
Concerning previous research, Quittkat (2011, pp. 661-662, 665) finds that more standard-
ized consultations are associated with a higher number of different types of participants. In
other words, that the actor bias is likely to be lower in standardized consultations. Format
therefore seems to have a similar effect on participation bias as it does on actor bias. This find-
ing also hold more generally for DGs organizing consultations, as opposed to that of Quittkat
(2011, pp. 656-657), who only includes consultations organized by two DGs.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s expectations
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) four expectations are all supported, as Table 6.1
shows. They are based on different aspects from pluralist theory. Again, whether these are the
actual causal workings behind the correlations cannot be concluded based on the results here.
The focus here is on the alternative expectations, elaborated upon in Chapter 2, related to
policy type and cost structure. These are based on the transactions perspective. Rasmussen &
Carroll (2014, p. 447) assume that distributive proposals affect a broader range of interests than
regulatory ones. The same is the case for proposals with a diffuse cost structure compared to
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ones with concentrated costs. Based on this, consultations concerning distributive proposals or
those with a diffuse cost structure are expected to be less biased. The alternative to this, based
on the transactions perspective, is that some groups have selective incentives to participate. The
interests of their specific constituencies are not likely to be represented by other, similar groups
otherwise. Groups representing diffuse interests, on the other hand, might not participate even
if they are affected by a consultation. Several other groups could represent these interests.
If every group of this type follows this logic, their interests are not going to be represented
at all. Consultations concerning distributive proposals or with diffuse costs are therefore not
necessarily less biased than those concerning regulations or with concentrated costs.
The statistical results lend support to the original expectations, however. Rasmussen & Car-
roll’s (2014, p. 454) findings are upheld when including the new variables. Still, the effects are
slightly weaker and the resulting decrease in bias is small in comparison to the initial findings.
Moreover, the proportion of civil society group participants – which generally represent diffuse
interests – is not estimated to be systematically higher in consultations concerning distributive
proposals or with diffuse costs1. These results indicate that the alternative expectations, based
on the transactions perspective, might have something to them as well. It could potentially
explain why the degree of bias in consultations characterized by diffuse costs or distributive
proposals is fairly similar to that in consultations characterized by concentrated costs or regu-
latory proposals.
This may moreover mean that not all affected interests are likely to be represented, as the
transactions perspective expects. The democratic, input legitimacy that can be derived from
the interest group channel can then be questioned. However, whether it is a lack of selective
incentives to participate that leads to the more similar bias patterns cannot be derived from these
statistical analyses. This also goes for the degree to which all affected interests are represented.
Determining this would require a more in-depth analysis.
1Going from regulatory to distributive proposals leads to a non-significant 54% decrease in bias – odds ratio
1.18, standard error 0.56. Going from diffuse to concentrated costs leads to a non-significant 42% increase in bias
– odds ratio 0.72, standard error 0.31.
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6.1.2 The direction of the bias
The two remaining new hypotheses – H2 and H6 – concern the direction of the bias. Table 6.2
gives an overview of the expectations and their theoretical foundations, as well as whether they
are supported.
Table 6.2: The hypotheses concerning the direction of the bias, their theoretical foundations and whether they are
supported
Hypothesis and theory Direction of the bias
H2a: Consultations organized by DGs mainly concerned with
regulatory matters are biased towards business interests.
H2b: Consultations organized by DGs mainly concerned with
distributive matters are biased towards civil society interests.
Theory: exchange. Interest groups’ supply and DGs’ demand
for information.
H2a: supported.
H2b: not supported.
H6a: Technically complex and salient, as well as complex and
less salient, consultations are biased towards occupational int-
erests.
H6b: Technically complex and less salient, as well as less
complex and less salient, consultations are biased towards busi-
ness interests.
H6c: Salient and less complex consultations are biased towards
citizen interests.
Theory: Gormley (1986), cost-benefit. Participation is assumed
to depend on the groups’ resources and concerns.
H6a: not supported.
H6b: slightly supported.
H6c: not supported.
DG type
As Table 6.2 shows, H2a is the only hypothesis concerning the direction of the bias that is fully
supported. Consultations organized by regulatory DGs are found to generally be highly biased
towards business interests. This is thus another expectation not derived from the initial pluralist
framework that is supported in this thesis. The theoretical reasoning behind this hypothesis
relates to the supply and demand for information. Business groups are assumed to be the most
relevant supplier of the technical information demanded by regulatory DGs (Coen & Katsaitis,
2013, pp. 1105-1106, 1108-1109). This can make it less costly for this type of group to con-
tribute. Although a statistical analysis cannot reveal the exact workings behind a correlation,
the chronological order of DG type and bias corroborates that it is the type of DG that causes
the effect. The finding furthermore indicates that the regulatory DGs are likely to get the infor-
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mation they demand, which might enhance the quality of the policies and be a source to output
legitimacy.
The EU mainly deals with regulatory matters (Hix & Høyland, 2011, p. 189). As the de-
scriptive statistics presented in Chapter 4 furthermore showed, most of the DGs organizing
consultations are categorized as regulatory. That the consultations organized by this type of
DG are biased towards business interests to a high degree is therefore arguably normatively
problematic as well. The finding highlights that the interest group channel does not reflect the
range of interests in society in these consultations. That the majority of online consultations
are organized by this type of DG underlines that this participatory exercise might not be as
inclusive as it is meant to be. The finding therefore implies that if regulatory DGs want a more
diverse set of interest groups to participate in their consultations, they might need to consider
specific strategies to achieve this.
H2b is not supported. The proportion of civil society groups it not found to be system-
atically higher in consultations organized by distributive DGs compared to regulatory ones.
Instead, a fairly high proportion of the participants is expected to be business interests. Again,
the interest group channel leads to some interests being better represented than others. The-
oretically, distributive DGs are assumed to demand political information, which civil society
groups are mainly assumed to possess (Coen & Katsaitis, 2013, pp. 1105-1106, 1108-1109).
Given the lack of support, this reasoning is not likely to be the whole story. It could for instance
be that distributive DGs mainly demand technical information when organizing consultations,
and that the political information they demand is supplied through other means. The findings
imply, however, that distributive DGs do not mainly get the political information they are as-
sumed to demand. The input legitimacy that can be derived from organizing consultations can
therefore be questioned.
The findings related to H2 furthermore shed light on a previous study. Coen & Katsaitis
(2013, pp. 1111-1114) find that business groups list the same types of policy areas that reg-
ulatory DGs deal with as interests when registering in the Commission’s Register of Interest
Representatives. The same holds for civil society groups and distributive DGs. However, the
costs of registering are likely to be lower than participating in, for instance, online consulta-
tions. This could affect the results. The support to H2a corroborates at least part of the idea
that the DG type does have an effect on the direction of the bias. The expectation is therefore
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somewhat supported when a specific activity is the unit of analysis as well.
Interaction between technical complexity and salience
H6 concerns the interaction between salience and technical complexity and consists of three
sub-hypotheses, as can be seen in Table 6.2. These expectations are based on Gormley (1986,
pp. 597-598, 603). Participation is assumed to depend on the groups’ resources and concerns.
These are presumed to be divergent, which leads to the expectation that different combinations
of technical complexity and salience result in a bias towards different types of interests.
H6a is not supported. Occupational groups are expected to participate in technically com-
plex consultations that are either salient or less so, because of their assumed expertise in the
field of the profession they represent. Since their participation is assumed to be based on this
know-how, they do not need to shy away from participating in salient consultations. The re-
sults show that occupational groups are likelier to participate in less complex consultations that
are either less salient or salient. Something other than the abovementioned explanation there-
fore seems to be at work here. In Gormley’s (1986, p. 603) theory, professionals are the actor
type discussed, whereas occupational groups are studied here. The results might therefore in-
dicate that what motivates a professional on his or her own is not the same as what makes an
occupational group participate.
H6b is slightly supported. The findings give some indication that less complex and less
salient consultations are biased towards business interests, although these results are uncertain.
However, contrary to the hypothesized effect, complex and salient consultations are found to
be the most biased towards business interests in general. Theoretically, business groups are
assumed to possess the resources necessary to be able to participate in either less complex or
complex consultations. They are, however, assumed to want to avoid drawing attention to their
trying to influence public decision-making (Gormley, 1986, pp. 604-605). Achieving this is
presumed to be likelier in less salient consultations. That the proportion of business interests is
predicted to be high in salient and complex consultations contradicts this. One potential reason
for this finding is that the complexity makes the issues more isolated from the public eye. It
could therefore be that they are not as likely to draw attention to themselves, even if the issues
are more salient. The analysis here does not uncover whether this is the case, however.
The high proportion of business interests in less complex and less salient, as well as com-
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plex and salient, consultations implies that the interest group channel does here not provide
the decision-makers with a representative picture of the interests in society. This could po-
tentially affect the representativeness of the proposals as well, if the participants are able to
wield influence. As discussed above, complexity has not been found to systematically affect
the chances of lobby success in the EU (Klu¨ver, 2011, pp. 496-497). However, both Mahoney
(2007, pp. 49-50) and Klu¨ver (2011, p. 497) find that an increase in salience leads to a lesser
chance of lobby success. Based on this, that business interests are well represented in less
complex and less salient consultations could potentially lead to more biased proposals as well.
On the other hand, the business dominance in complex and salient consultations might not be
as normatively problematic since the chances of being successful are likely to be lower.
Lastly, H6c is not supported. Less complex and salient consultations are only found to
be slightly more biased towards citizen interests when using a sparser model. The finding
is furthermore uncertain. Theoretically, citizen groups are assumed to face more barriers in
technically complex consultations, making it likelier that they participate in less complex ones.
Furthermore, salient consultations are assumed to be relevant for citizen groups’ constituencies,
which make it pertinent for them to participate here (Gormley, 1986, pp. 603-604). Although
a statistical analysis cannot indicate whether this is actually the case, the results indicate that
it might be part of the story. Normatively, the finding – albeit uncertain – is arguably not
particularly problematic. The proportion of citizen group participants is generally not predicted
to be especially high. There is room left for other types of interests to be represented as well.
6.2 Interest group perspectives
In Chapter 1, three interest group perspectives were presented – the pluralist, transactions and
neo-pluralist perspectives. It was furthermore argued that pluralistic, unbiased participation
patterns were likely to be the outcome because of the relatively few barriers to entry in online
consultations. Here, how the findings relate to these perspectives is discussed.
Based on the pluralist perspective, the participation patterns in the consultations are ex-
pected to be characterized by a low degree of bias. The participation patterns in consultations
characterized by a low degree of actor bias or by a high number of interest group participants –
two of Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, p. 448) variables – are found to be fairly unbiased. How-
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ever, they are closely related to the dependent variable in both time and what they measure,
making these findings less interesting.
The second perspective – transactions – would expect the participation patterns to be highly
biased. This is found to generally be the case in consultations characterized by being techni-
cally complex or organized by regulatory DGs. In the latter case business groups dominate,
as expected. Furthermore, consultations characterized by different combinations of technical
complexity and salience are also found to be biased towards business interests to a fairly high
degree – with the exception of salient and less complex consultations. Whether the consul-
tations are biased because affected groups do not have selective incentives to participate, as
the transactions perspective assumes, cannot be determined based on the results in this thesis,
however.
In addition, the consultations characterized by what Rasmussen & Carroll (2014, pp. 447-
448) assume will affect fewer interests are also biased to a large degree. This is the case for
consultations concerning regulatory proposals, with concentrated cost structures, a high degree
of actor bias and fewer interest group participants. This could, however, be in line with the
pluralist perspective. Fewer interests are assumed to be affected, meaning that they could
potentially all be represented.
Lastly, neo-pluralism reads as a fusion between the pluralist and transactions perspectives.
The expectation here is a somewhat biased participation pattern. This is arguably the outcome
for most of the consultations characterized by the factors that are expected to mitigate bias.
This holds for less technically complex consultations, ones concerning distributive proposals,
as well as consultations with diffuse cost structures. The latter two characteristics are assumed
to affect more interests (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014, p. 447), but this does thus generally not
lead to even more unbiased participation patterns in line with the pluralist perspective. In ad-
dition, consultations characterized by being salient and less complex are also not highly biased
towards any one of the group types examined. The participation in consultations organized by
distributive DGs is furthermore also somewhere between biased and unbiased.
To summarize, online consultations are generally not characterized by pluralistic partici-
pation patterns, even though they arguably constitute a most likely case for this. The charac-
teristics that are assumed to lead to less biased outcomes do this, but only to a certain degree.
The patterns are therefore more similar to what one would expect based on the neo-pluralist
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perspective. Two exceptions here are consultations characterized by a low degree of actor bias
and a high number of interest group participants. The participation patterns here are closer
to unbiased, as the pluralist perspective expects. The characteristics that are assumed to lead
to more biased outcomes also do this. The participation patterns are therefore more in line
with the expectation based on the transactions perspective. This is also the case for most of
the characteristics that are expected to affect the direction of the bias. However, to determine
more decisively whether the findings are in line with one or the other perspective would require
further research. Neither the degree to which all affected interests is represented, nor what
motivates the participants, can be determined here.
6.3 Conclusion
The research question that has guided this thesis is which features pertaining to the European
Commission’s online consultations that can explain participation bias. A biased consultation is
understood as one where not every type of group participates to an equal degree. Rasmussen
& Carroll (2014) also examine this, and their study lays the foundation for this thesis. Further-
more, the pluralist, transactions and neo-pluralist interest group perspectives are more gener-
ally underlying this exploration. Online consultations are open for everyone and participating
is likely to be less costly than in other participatory activities. They therefore constitute a most
likely case for pluralistic participation patterns, characterized by a low degree of bias. Instead,
however, patterns resembling what one would expect based on neo-pluralism are the outcome
for most of the characteristics that are expected to lead to a lower degree of bias.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations are based on pluralist theory. This
framework is taken one step further in this thesis, by adding an exchange theoretical and a
broader cost-benefit perspective. The main idea here is that less affected interests might not
contribute if they do not already possess the relevant information to do so, or if the costs asso-
ciated with participating is high compared to the potential benefits. New hypotheses concerning
the type of DG organizing a consultation, EU activity, format, technical complexity and an in-
teraction between technical complexity and salience are derived from these perspectives. An
additional hypothesis that is based on pluralist ideas is also added, concerning salience. Sta-
tistical analyses of 308 online consultations organized between 2001 and 2011 were used to
97
examine these hypotheses.
Overall, two new characteristics – technical complexity and DG type – are found to explain
participation bias. First, technically complex consultations are found to generally be more
biased than less complex ones to a relatively high degree. Second, consultations organized
by regulatory DGs are found to generally be highly biased towards business interests. The
remaining new features examined in this thesis were not found to have the expected effect on
bias, with the slight exception of the format of a consultation.
Theoretically, these findings indicate that non-pluralist perspectives can be relevant to ex-
plain participation bias as well. Less affected interests might not be represented if the costs
of participating are high, which is assumed to be the case for technically complex consul-
tations. Similarly, possessing relevant information might make participating easier and less
costly. Business groups are assumed to possess the type of information regulatory DGs de-
mand, which may be why business interests are better represented in consultations organized
by this type of DG. Furthermore, in a normative sense, the biased participation in these con-
sultations implies that the interest group channel here functions more poorly as a source to
input legitimacy. The Commission’s goal for the consultations to be inclusive is not likely to
be achieved (European Commission, 2002, pp. 16-17). Regulatory DGs’ demand for output
legitimacy, on the other hand, may be supplied.
How the openness of the consultations affects bias is also considered in this thesis. Most
consultations are open for everyone, but some have specific target groups or are closed to all but
select actors. The results give some support to the idea that selective and closed consultations
are more biased than open ones. Furthermore, whether different factors affect bias in open,
selective and closed consultations were considered. The results, although uncertain, indicate
that this could be the case.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 447-448) expectations are all supported here as well.
This indicates that their findings are robust. They still hold after adding new observations,
taking the hierarchical structure of the data into account and controlling for new variables.
However, the two alternative, transactions based expectations proposed in this thesis for the
policy type and cost structure characteristics might be relevant as well. The ideas here could
explain why the effects of these variables are estimated to be weaker in the expanded model.
Moreover, how interesting the actor bias and interest group density findings are have been
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questioned. These variables are closely linked to the dependent variable in time, which could
make the direction of the potential causal effects more clouded. They could be caused by the
dependent variable as well.
Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014, pp. 453-456) analysis of what affects the bias towards busi-
ness interests was also carried out in this thesis. Their conclusions also hold here. Of the
new variables, only technical complexity was found to lead to a somewhat higher proportion
of business group participants. Comparing these results to what explains the general degree of
bias shows that there are some differences.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are differences between the EU and national settings
which lessen the possibility of generalizing the findings in this thesis. One is the prevalence of
groups from different national settings and European wide associations at the EU level. Another
difference is that the EU mainly deals with regulatory matters, which might be more relevant
for business interests. These aspects imply that there might be systematic differences between
the EU and its member states when it comes to participation bias. Furthermore, the potential to
generalize to other types of consultations, such as expert groups or conferences, is also likely
to be somewhat limited. As mentioned, there are fewer barriers to entry in online consultations.
Participation in the other types of consultation exercises might for instance require an invitation,
which does not leave the decision to participate up to each actor on its own.
In addition to the substantial findings, two methodological aspects are also considered in
this thesis. First, the cases where there were substantial differences between the classical and
robust standard errors were taken into account by improving the models. Differences between
these errors indicate that the model is misspecified, which can affect the estimates (King &
Roberts, 2014, pp. 1-3, 6-7). Second, the power to detect effects of different sizes was con-
sidered. The lack of support to some of the new hypotheses might be explained by the limited
power to detect small effects. That some of the estimates are significant when using sparser
models lends some support to this idea. A much larger sample would be needed to conclude
with more certainty that the non-significant estimates do not systematically affect bias.
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7 Codebook
DG bin: regulatory or distributive DGs. Regulatory DGs are coded as 0: Climate Action; Com-
munication; Communications Networks, Content and Technology; Competition; Economic
and Financial Affairs; Energy; Enterprise and Industry; Environment; Health and Consumers;
Home Affairs; Informatics; Internal Market and Services; Justice; Mobility and Transport;
Secretariat-General; Taxation and Customs Union; Trade. Distributive DGs are coded as 1:
Agriculture and Rural Development; Budget; Education and Culture; Employment, Social Af-
fairs and Inclusion; EuropeAid Development and Cooperation; Maritime Affairs and Fisheries;
Regional Policy; Research and Innovation.
DG omf: The proportion of distributive consultations each DG has organized. The number
of consultations concerning distributive policies a DG has organized is divided by its total
number of consultations.
DG ans: The number of employees the DG organizing a consultation had in 2006 or 2009.
Consultations organized in 2006 or earlier are given the numbers from 2006. Consultations
organized after this are given the numbers from 2009. Where numbers from 2006 are missing,
the number of employees in 2009 is assigned.
legact: The number of passed regulations, directives and decisions in the policy area a con-
sultation falls in, lagged by one year. Each consultation is connected to the most relevant
policy area and assigned its number of legislative acts.
consform: The format of a consultation. Consultations are coded as 0 if they only include
closed questions; 1 if they are semi-standardized with both open and closed questions; 2 if they
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are non-standardized and only include open questions.
DG tc: Whether the policy area a consultation falls in is technically complex. Less complex
policy areas are coded as 0: Education and Culture; Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion;
Home Affairs; Justice; Mobility and Transport; Research and Innovation. Complex policy areas
are coded as 1: Agriculture and Rural Development; Budget; Climate Action; Communication;
Communications Networks, Content and Technology; Competition; Economic and Financial
Affairs; Energy; Enterprise and Industry; Environment; EuropeAid, Development and Cooper-
ation; Health and Consumers; Informatics; Internal Market and Services; Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries; Regional Policy; Secretariat-General; Taxation and Customs Union; Trade.
cons oc: Whether a consultation calls for comments from everyone. Open consultations are
coded as 0; consultations where some actors are singled, but that otherwise are open for every-
one are coded as 1; consultations where only specific actors are asked to contribute are coded
as 2.
cons sal: The salience of the policy area a consultation falls in, lagged by one year. This is
based on a question in the Eurobarometer surveys that asks the respondents to pick two issues
that they consider to be the most important ones facing their country at the moment. Each
consultation is linked to one of the 15 policy areas and given the EU level percentage of re-
spondents deeming this issue the most important. The “other” category is used when none of
the substantive issues are relevant. If there are more than one Eurobarometer survey in a given
year, the mean of the percentages is assigned. The collective transport category is discontinued
from 2006. If a consultation concerns this issue later, it is given the mean of the percentages
from between 2003 and 2006. The question was introduced in 2003 – consultations organized
before this are given the relevant percentage from this year.
pro biz: The proportion of trade and other business group participants.
pro occ: The proportion of occupational group participants.
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pro civ: The proportion of public interests and identity group participants.
DG navn: The name of the DG that organized the consultation.
DGpolicy: The DG or policy area a consultation falls in. The consultations organized by
DG Competition, DG Internal Market and DG Environment are classified based on the policy
activity a given consultation is filed under on their websites (Directorate-General for Competi-
tion, 2014; Directorate-General for the Environment, 2015; Directorate-General for the Internal
Market and Services, 2014). A requirement is that more than one consultation is filed under the
same activity. The consultations organized by DG Justice and DG Mobility and Transport are
categorized based on the themes of the consultations. The consultations organized by DG Bud-
get, DG Informatics and DG Communication are coded as “EU matters”. The consultations
organized by DG Agriculture and Rural Development and DG Maritime Affairs are coded as
“Agriculture and fisheries”. The consultation organized by DG Economic and Financial Affairs
is merged with DG Internal Market, since the consultation relates to the completion of the inter-
nal market (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2013). The consultation
organized by DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion is merged with DG Internal Mar-
ket, since this is one of the policy fields listed on the consultation website (Directorate-General
for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2010).
The rest of the measures for the new consultations were coded according to the instructions
in Rasmussen & Carroll’s (2014) codebook. Some specifications were made for year and den-
sity. First, if a consultation takes place during the turn of the year, it is coded as the year it
ended. Second, if there are multiple contributions from the same participant in a consultation,
it is only counted once.
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8 Comparing interest distributions
Table 8.1: The interest group type distribution in the online consultations and in the EU interest group population
(Transparency Register)
Trade and
other
business
Occupational Trade unions
Public
interests Identity
Public auth-
orities as
members
Others Total
Total consultations,
Rasmussen & Carroll
3,880
(59.17%)
989
(15.08%)
170
(2.59%)
792
(12.08%)
161
(2.46%)
266
(4.06%)
299
(4.56%)
6,557
(100%)
Total consultations,
expanded sample
7,691
(56.02%)
1,961
(14.28%)
417
(3.04%)
1,799
(13.10%)
358
(2.61%)
516
(3.76%)
988
(7.20%)
13,730
(100.01%)
Complex
6,728
(59.05%)
1,565
(13.74%)
327
(2.87%)
1,380
(12.11%)
170
(1.49%)
430
(3.77%)
793
(6.96%)
11,393
(99.99%)
Less complex
963
(41.21%)
396
(16.94%)
90
(3.85%)
419
(17.93%)
188
(8.04%)
86
(3.68%)
195
(8.34%)
2,337
(99.99%)
Regulatory DG
7,215
(58.48%)
1,845
(14.96%)
358
(2.90%)
1,569
(12.72%)
265
(2.15%)
285
(2.31%)
800
(6.48%)
12,337
(100%)
Distributive DG
476
(34.17%)
116
(8.33%)
59
(4.24%)
230
(16.51%)
93
(6.68%)
231
(16.58%)
188
(13.50%)
1,393
(100.01%)
Total Register
1,435
(51.90%)
314
(11.36%)
56
(2.03%)
500
(18.08%)
73
(2.64%)
20
(0.72%)
367
(13.27%)
2,765
(100%)
Note: Using a chi-square contingency test shows the distributions are statistically significant from each other.
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9 Regression and out-of-sample results
Table 9.1: Year estimates from the OLS, multilevel and fractional logit regressions
HHI Transformed HHI Transformed Prop. bus. and occ.
HHI HHI
OLS OLS linear linear logistic
mixed-effects mixed-effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 0.075 0.058 0.004 0.034 0.041 0.004 0.182 0.078 −0.497
(0.196) (0.190) (0.124) (0.187) (0.180) (0.120) (2.811) (2.800) (2.830)
2003 0.087 0.070 0.044 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.786 0.617 0.708
(0.199) (0.194) (0.127) (0.192) (0.185) (0.125) (2.935) (2.924) (3.127)
2004 0.201 0.185 0.104 0.124 0.125 0.067 0.767 0.462 0.102
(0.189) (0.182) (0.118) (0.185) (0.177) (0.116) (2.780) (2.754) (2.764)
2005 0.085 0.065 0.024 0.017 0.007 −0.006 0.304 0.071 −0.320
(0.188) (0.183) (0.118) (0.181) (0.175) (0.115) (2.761) (2.744) (2.750)
2006 0.174 0.159 0.079 0.091 0.090 0.042 0.606 0.343 0.071
(0.185) (0.180) (0.117) (0.181) (0.174) (0.114) (2.732) (2.714) (2.732)
2007 0.105 0.086 0.039 0.043 0.037 0.011 0.211 −0.008 −0.091
(0.187) (0.181) (0.117) (0.181) (0.174) (0.114) (2.739) (2.720) (2.733)
2008 0.091 0.066 0.010 0.010 −0.004 −0.019 0.392 0.064 −0.227
(0.186) (0.180) (0.117) (0.181) (0.174) (0.114) (2.731) (2.711) (2.727)
2009 0.122 0.087 0.029 0.036 0.017 −0.003 0.815 0.466 0.103
(0.184) (0.179) (0.116) (0.180) (0.173) (0.114) (2.718) (2.700) (2.723)
2010 0.113 0.110 0.043 0.039 0.053 0.011 0.453 −0.019 −0.395
(0.186) (0.178) (0.116) (0.182) (0.172) (0.114) (2.743) (2.690) (2.715)
2011 0.121 0.051 0.061 0.020 0.002 −0.508
(0.179) (0.116) (0.173) (0.114) (2.696) (2.717)
N 210 308 302 210 308 302 210 308 302
Note: 2001 is the baseline category. ∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Table 9.2: OLS results for 1) open consultations, 2) selective consultations and 3) closed consultations
Transformed HHI
(1) (2) (3)
Expenditure policy −0.052∗ −0.033 0.042
(0.027) (0.033) (0.176)
Administrative policy −0.008 0.038 −0.317
(0.026) (0.041) (0.168)
Concentrated costs 0.048∗∗ 0.049∗ −0.017
(0.023) (0.029) (0.114)
Actor bias 0.349∗∗∗ 0.053 0.331
(0.084) (0.122) (0.352)
Density −0.063∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.023) (0.024) (0.102)
Duration 0.0005 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.002) (0.003) (0.015)
Salience 0.00001 0.0002 −0.011
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007)
DG type −0.118∗∗∗ −0.064 0.191
(0.041) (0.050) (0.314)
Number of staff 0.00003 0.0001∗∗ −0.0004
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Non-standardized 0.023 0.012 −0.234
(0.025) (0.037) (0.180)
Technical complexity 0.055∗ 0.092 0.272
(0.032) (0.070) (0.218)
Tech. compl. × sal. −0.0002 0.001
(0.002) (0.006)
N 187 92 23
R2 0.381 0.567 0.747
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.437 −0.112
Residual Std. Error 0.119 (df = 164) 0.102 (df = 70) 0.104 (df = 5)
F Statistic 4.586∗∗∗ (df = 22; 164) 4.364∗∗∗ (df = 21; 70) 0.870 (df = 17; 5)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Table 9.3: OLS results without actor bias (1), interest group density (2) and excluding both (3), expanded model
Transformed HHI
(1) (2) (3)
Density −0.075∗∗∗
(0.016)
Actor bias 0.270∗∗∗
(0.065)
Expenditure policy −0.056∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Administrative policy −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Concentrated costs 0.035∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Duration −0.002 −0.002 −0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Salience −0.0005 0.0001 −0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DG type −0.077∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Number of staff 0.00005 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Non-standardized 0.031 0.033∗ 0.040∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Technical complexity 0.065∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Tech. compl. × sal. 0.001 −0.0002 0.00004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Selective 0.025 0.037∗∗ 0.033∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Closed 0.012 0.030 0.025
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
N 302 302 302
R2 0.333 0.322 0.279
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.265 0.222
Residual Std. Error 0.116 (df = 278) 0.117 (df = 278) 0.121 (df = 279)
F Statistic 6.039∗∗∗ (df = 23; 278) 5.730∗∗∗ (df = 23; 278) 4.908∗∗∗ (df = 22; 279)
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Table 9.4: Fractional logit results without actor bias (1), interest group density (2) and excluding both (3), ex-
panded model
Proportion of bus. and occ.
group participants
(1) (2) (3)
Density −0.129
(0.311)
Actor bias 1.130
(1.406)
Expenditure policy −0.590 −0.566 −0.611
(0.387) (0.387) (0.384)
Administrative policy −0.046 −0.039 −0.048
(0.429) (0.430) (0.430)
Concentrated costs 0.367 0.392 0.369
(0.353) (0.355) (0.354)
Duration 0.013 0.014 0.010
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Salience −0.009 −0.007 −0.009
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
DG type −1.142∗∗ −1.207∗∗ −1.152∗∗
(0.521) (0.526) (0.521)
Number of staff −0.0001 −0.00004 −0.00005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-standardized 0.269 0.255 0.283
(0.393) (0.392) (0.391)
Technical complexity 0.183 0.142 0.179
(0.505) (0.507) (0.506)
Tech. compl. × sal. 0.034 0.032 0.033
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Selective 0.110 0.146 0.123
(0.374) (0.374) (0.373)
Closed 0.035 0.083 0.054
(0.583) (0.583) (0.579)
N 302 302 302
Log Likelihood −105.789 −105.831 −105.523
AIC 259.578 259.662 257.045
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Table 9.5: OLS and multilevel linear results, arcsine square root transformed proportion of business and occupa-
tional group participants as the dependent variable, expanded model
Arcsine square root transformed proportion
of bus. and occ. group participants
OLS linear
mixed-effects
(1) (2)
Expenditure policy −0.112∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.039) (0.040)
Administrative policy 0.011 0.016
(0.042) (0.041)
Concentrated costs 0.094∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.034) (0.032)
Actor bias 0.354∗∗∗ 0.221∗
(0.127) (0.122)
Density −0.048 −0.047
(0.031) (0.030)
Duration 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Salience −0.003 0.0001
(0.003) (0.003)
DG type −0.307∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.078)
Number of staff −0.00003 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Non-standardized 0.058 0.013
(0.039) (0.039)
Technical complexity 0.054 0.148∗
(0.052) (0.084)
Tech. compl. × sal. 0.008∗∗ 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Selective 0.025 0.041
(0.035) (0.034)
Closed −0.001 0.011
(0.055) (0.053)
Consultation/policy area level N 302/0 302/30
R2 0.455
Adjusted R2 0.408
Residual Std. Error 0.230 (df = 277)
F Statistic 9.626∗∗∗ (df = 24; 277)
Log Likelihood −31.039
AIC 116.079
BIC 216.260
Note: The random intercept variance for model 2 is 0.015, standard deviation 0.121.
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Figure 9.1: The effect of salience on the proportion of occupational group participants depending on technical
complexity (sparser model), predicted probabilities, 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 9.2: The effect of salience on the proportion of business group participants depending on technical com-
plexity (sparser model), predicted probabilities, 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 9.3: The effect of salience on the proportion of citizen group participants depending on technical complex-
ity (sparser model), predicted probabilities, 95% confidence intervals
Out-of-sample performance results
For the general degree of bias in the expanded model, the error rate is estimated to be between
0.014 and 0.015, depending on the test. Four different ones are used – a validation set, leave-
one-out cross-validation, and a five- and ten-fold cross-validation test. Removing activity and
salience results in an error rate estimated to be between 0.013 and 0.01. The estimated error
rate for the initial model is around 0.015, when using the expanded sample and the square root
transformed HHI measure as the dependent variable to make the results comparable.
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